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Beginning to Learn How to End: Lessons on 
Completion Strategies, Residual Mechanisms, 
and Legacy Considerations from Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals to the 
International Criminal Court 
DAFNA GOZANI* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Countries recovering from widespread human rights violations 
face the challenge of restoring civic trust in the domestic rule of law, 
repairing the social fabric of society, and building a foundation for long-
term peace and reconciliation.1 Although the creation of international 
criminal courts and tribunals has been a positive step towards “advanc-
ing a global system of ending impunity for the most serious crimes,” 
their creation alone is insufficient to promote a just and lasting resolu-
tion of conflict.2 The international community must take steps to ensure 
that the contributions of international tribunals are not undermined or 
reversed by the manner in which they close their operations and that 
their legacy is preserved.3 
 
 
* J.D., Loyola Law School, 2013. I would like to thank No Peace Without Justice for allowing me 
to see firsthand the wonderful impact civil society can have in the fight against impunity, Profes-
sor Cesare P.R. Romano, Professor David Glazier, Professor Anna Spain, and Laura Cadra for 
enriching my international law education, the dedicated staff of Loyola’s International and Com-
parative Law Review for their helpful feedback during the editing process, and my family and 
friends for their support and encouragement. 
 1. Stakeholders Convene on Legacy of the SCSL, EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE 
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://scsl-legacy.ictj.org/about-project (last visited Jan. 25, 
2013) [hereinafter Stakeholders Convene on Legacy of the SCSL].  
 2. Caitlin Reiger, Where to from Here for International Tribunals? Considering Legacy 
and Residual Issues, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1, 5 (Sept. 2009), 
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Legacy-Tribunal-2009-English.pdf. 
 3. Id.  
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The legacy of an international criminal tribunal is its “lasting im-
pact on bolstering the rule of law in a particular society, by conducting 
effective trials to contribute to ending impunity, while also strengthen-
ing domestic capacity.”4 Thus, as former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan stated, “it is essential that, from the moment any future interna-
tional or hybrid tribunal is established, considerations be given, as a pri-
ority, to the ultimate exit strategy and intended legacy in the country 
concerned.”5 
The idea of an international court first came about in the aftermath 
of World War II.6 At the conclusion of the war, the Allies set up the Nu-
remberg and Tokyo tribunals to try Axis war criminals.7 In 1948, the 
U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution inviting the International 
Law Commission (ILC) to study the desirability and possibility of es-
tablishing an international judicial organ for the trial of individuals and 
groups charged with genocide or crimes with similar gravity.8 Despite 
the ILC having drafted a statute in the early 1950s, the Cold War de-
railed these efforts; “the General Assembly effectively abandoned the 
effort pending agreement on a definition for the crime of aggression and 
an International Code of Crimes.”9 
Generally, there are three generations of criminal bodies. The first 
generation includes the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals; the second 
generation includes the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR); and lastly, the third generation includes the International Crim-
inal Court and the hybrid criminal bodies, which includes the Special 
 
 4. Robin Vincent, An Administrative Practices Manual for Internationally Assisted Crimi-
nal Justice Institutions, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1, 151 (2007), 
http://wcjp.unicri.it/proceedings/docs/ICTJ_Admin%20Manual%20Criminal%20Justice_2007_en
g.pdf. 
 5. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
conflict Societies, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf. 
 6. Claire Calzonetti, Frequently Asked Questions about the International Criminal Court, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/courts-and-tribunals/frequently-asked-
questions-international-criminal-court/p8981 (last updated July 23, 2012). 
 7. Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribu-
nals, 100 AM SOC. INT’L L. 551, 554–55 (2006). 
 8. See ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 17 (2008). 
 9. History of the ICC, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. COURT, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory (last visited on Jan. 25, 2015). The International Crimi-
nal Court, PROJECT ON INT’L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ICC.html 
(last visited on Sept. 7, 2014).  
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Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL).10 In the 1990s, the first ad hoc criminal 
tribunals were established in response to the atrocities committed in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.11 The international community, 
through the U.N. Security Council, created the ICTY and the ICTR in 
1993 and 1994, respectively.12 In 2002, the U.N., in cooperation with 
the Sierra Leone government, set up a new type of court in response to 
the mass killings and other human rights violations in Sierra Leone: the 
SCSL, a hybrid, ad hoc international criminal tribunal that combined the 
characteristics of both a national and international court.13 
While these three institutions were each unique, they all had one 
major feature in common: they were temporary.14 Thus, while the SCSL 
differs from the ICTY and ICTR by being a hybrid institution, for the 
purposes of this note, these three institutions will be referred to as ad 
hoc international criminal courts.15 The SCSL was the first of the three 
to complete its mandate;16 the ICTY and the ICTR are expected to com-
plete their mandates in the upcoming year.17 The closure of these tribu-
nals, their residual mechanisms, and their attempts to establish a posi-
tive legacy will not only serve as examples for other existing and future 
ad hoc tribunals, but will also provide valuable lessons for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”); the first permanent inter-
national court and the first court with global application.18 
Since the first of the post-Cold War ad hoc criminal tribunals only 
recently completed its mandate,19 developing the best practices for com-
 
 10. Hybrid Courts, THE PROJECT ON INT’L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, http://www.pict-
pcti.org/courts/hybrid.html (last visited July 15, 2014). 
 11. Ad hoc Tribunals, THE INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/international-criminal-jurisdiction/ad-hoc-
tribunals/overview-ad-hoc-tribunals.htm. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Hybrid Courts, supra note 10. 
 15. Id. (Other examples of hybrid institutions are the Crimes Panels of the District Court of 
Dili,”Regulation 64” Panels in the Courts of Kosovo, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia.) 
 16. Charles Chemor Jalloh, The Sierra Leon Special Court and Its Legacy (Mar. 13, 2014), 
http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2014/03/the-sierra-leone-special-court-and-its-legacy; see also 
Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach and Public Affairs Office, Special Court 
Hands Over Courthouse and Complex to the Government of Sierra Leone (Dec. 2, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/2013/pressrelease-120213a.pdf [hereinafter Special 
Court Press Release].  
 17. Kevin Jon Heller, Completion Strategies, in THE INT’L PROSECUTORS 11-12 (2012). 
 18. ICC at a Glance, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/ICCAtAGlanceEng.pdf (last visited July 18, 2014). 
 19. Special Court Press Release, supra note 16. 
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pletion strategies, residual mechanisms, and legacy considerations are 
still in their beginning stages.20 As one member of the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone’s Management Committee recently said, “we have been 
successful in establishing tribunals. We must be as successful in ending 
them.”21 
This note will argue that the ICC should take a broad approach to 
legacy by fostering affected communities’ ownership and understanding 
of the judicial proceedings, promoting reconciliation, and prioritizing 
restorative over retributive justice. A broader conception of legacy 
would place a greater emphasis on facilitating a path toward sustainable 
peace.22 In addition, this approach would not be limited to the victims or 
witnesses of human rights violations; rather, it acknowledges the impact 
that mass crimes have on future generations and the implication about 
the possibilities for future societal reconciliation.23 As emphasized by 
the Honorable Judge Vagn Joensen, President of the ICTR, “[n]ot only 
must justice be done, it must also be seen to be done.”24 In order to max-
imize the ICC’s potential, the international community needs to engage 
in and prioritize legacy planning from the outset of its activities.25 
 
 20. About The Mechanism, U.N. MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNALS, 
http://www.unmict.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) [hereinafter About The Mecha-
nism]; Home, EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://scsl-
legacy.ictj.org/about-project (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) [hereinafter EXPLORING THE LEGACY]; 
see also Daryl A. Mundis, Completing the Mandates of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribu-
nals: Lessons from the Nuremberg Process?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 591 (2005) (discussing the 
challenges facing the closing of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). 
 21. Heller, supra note 17 (internal quotations omitted).  
 22. The more conservative approach of legacy tends to prioritize activities such as 
knowledge transfer between international and national staff, as well as training and facilitating 
legal reform. Alison Cole, What is the International Criminal Court’s Legacy?, THIS IS SIERRA 
LEONE (July 17, 2012), http://www.thisissierraleone.com/what-is-the-legacy-of-the-international-
criminal-court. 
 23. For more information about the intergenerational transmission of trauma and its negative 
impact on the formation of cultural identity and reconciliation, see ALEXANDER A. LUPIS, 
SCHOLAR RESEARCH BRIEF: INTER-GENERATION TRANSMISSION OF TRAUMA IN CROATIA: 
VETERANS FAMILIES 20 YEARS AFTER THE SIEGE OF VUKOVAR, IREX 4 (2011); Yael Danieli, 
Recovery after Mass Crimes, in THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEACE (Nigel J. Young ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2010), available at 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195334685.001.0001/acref-
9780195334685-e-609. 
 24. Judge Vagn Joensen, The Legacy of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Future of Interna-
tional Criminal Justice, YOUTUBE (Nov. 13, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPBF_l3tYsI&list=WLuZ0b-NS3V6lIzTKHtI3pyba-
WILWGCMX. 
 25. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools 
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This note will also discuss the legacy lessons that the ICC can 
learn from the closing of the three ad hoc international criminal courts  
(the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL). While the ICC is a permanent in-
stitution, it will still disengage from the situation countries once the tri-
als are completed; therefore, it has much to gain by looking to the expe-
riences of the ad hoc courts, which were established as temporary 
institutions from the outset.26 The ICC’s greatest challenges will be en-
couraging local ownership of the trials, increasing the rule of law, and 
helping to repair the shredded fabric of society after horrific widespread 
human rights violations. To preserve the legacy of the ICC’s work, the 
Court’s focus must go beyond simply trials and convictions; it must in-
stead focus on strengthening the rule of law and helping to establish the 
foundation for lasting peace. 
Part I of this note will provide a general overview of completion 
strategies, residual issues, and legacy considerations. Part II of this note 
will provide a very brief background on the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, 
and discuss their utilization of completions strategies in approaching re-
sidual issues and legacy considerations. Part III will examine how the 
ICC can incorporate lessons from the experiences of the ad hoc interna-
tional criminal courts and will argue that, for the ICC to achieve its full 
potential, it needs to embrace a broader conception of legacy. Finally, 
Part IV will conclude that, regardless of an international court’s perma-
nent or temporary nature, the prioritization of completion plans, residual 
mechanisms, and legacy strategies through focusing on the affected 
community’s needs are essential to protecting these institution’s legacy 
and work. 
II.  COMPLETION STRATEGIES, RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS, AND LEGACY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
International ad hoc criminal courts and tribunals are “transitory 
investments in providing justice, intended to provide what the domestic 
justice systems cannot deliver alone due to a lack of capacity, independ-
ence, or political will, resulting in part from the legacy of the conflict.”27 
 
for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts, at 16, U.N. Doc. 
HR/PUB/08/2 (2008), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HybridCourts.pdf [herein-
after Rule-of-Law Tools]. 
 26.   A situation country is the location where the alleged violations took place. For more 
information, see Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Situations and Cases].  
 27.   Reiger, supra note 2, at 1. 
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Unlike domestic courts, the international community expects interna-
tional criminal courts and tribunals “to assist in the transformation of 
post-conflict societies, or at the very least,” to establish a legacy that 
will stimulate some positive transformation.28 Upon completion of its 
judicial proceedings, each institution faces three interrelated challenges: 
completion strategies, residual issues, and legacy considerations. 
Some scholars argue that “[l]egacy must be domestically owned 
and driven. A hybrid or international tribunal should be viewed not as a 
driver but as a catalyst in terms of motivating a broader set of initia-
tives.”29 However, in contrast to legacy issues, there are some residual 
functions that simply cannot be “domestically owned and driven.”30 
Thus, while it is important to encourage input from affected communi-
ties and inform them of completion strategies, there are also some in-
stances in which the court must handle the residual mechanisms exclu-
sively, at least in the beginning of their implementation. 
A.  Completion Strategies 
Completion strategies refer to the court or tribunal’s work leading 
up to its closing, which includes the preparation work to handle residual 
issues that arise from the institution’s closure.31 Completion is important 
for ensuring the credibility and perceived legitimacy of these courts and 
tribunals. It would be harmful for an institution with a goal to pursue the 
end of impunity to continue indefinitely.32 
In theory, it is logical for any institution undertaking proceedings 
with a limited timeframe to begin to plan for its eventual closure at the 
earliest stage possible.33 However, because of the complicated and de-
tailed nature of the proceedings, these institutions typically begin to ad-
dress such issues after trial proceedings are already underway.34 In a 
framework of limited resources, it is inevitable that these institutions 
will be pressured to conclude their operations based on financial con-
 
 28.   Mohamed Suma, The Charles Taylor Trial and Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone for Sierra Leone, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1, 1 (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-SierraLeone-Special-Court-2009-English.pdf.  
 29.  Vincent, supra note 4, at 151. 
 30.  Gabriel Oosthuizen, Open Society Justice Initiative, The Residual Functions of the U.N. 
International Criminal Tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone: The Potential Role of the International Criminal Court, 1, 5 (Sept. 30, 2008) (un-
published draft), available at http://www.iclsfoundation.org. 
 31.  Id. at 5. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Vincent, supra note 4, at 145. 
 34.  See id. 
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siderations; as a result, a very real danger exists that financial considera-
tions will drive the judicial process.35 Therefore, it is particularly im-
portant that the planning happens early and in a transparent manner so 
investors can understand the institution’s methodology and allow the 
focus to remain on the needs of the affected community, where it be-
longs. 
Because these institutions are generally a response of the preced-
ing conflict that necessitated the involvement of an international crimi-
nal court or tribunal, they are unable to rely on domestic judicial sys-
tems to continually enforce court orders, supervise lengthy prison terms, 
and provide on-going witness protection.36 As a result, the closing such 
institutions raises long-term planning concerns. 
By understanding that these ad hoc tribunals would eventually end, 
the conception of their completion strategies is typically described in 
terms of three milestones: first, the conclusion of every prosecutorial 
investigation; second, “the end of all first instance trials;” and finally, 
third, the “conclusion of all appeals from trial judgments.”37 Completion 
strategies are also interconnected with residual mechanisms and legacy 
planning because they set out the required residual mechanisms neces-
sary to ensure that the court’s work and legacy will not be undone after 
it closes. 
B.  Residual Issues and Mechanisms 
Residual issues refer to the enduring tasks of on-going legal and 
moral obligations to those directly affected by the tribunals after the tri-
bunals close.38 “[A]s a matter of principle, [residual mechanisms] should 
not only be consistent with the founding [of closing] documents, but al-
so further the objectives of these courts.”39 Indeed, this entails some 
very important responsibilities as matters of life or death and the protec-
tion of fundamental human rights are sometimes involved.40 The main 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Reiger, supra note 2, at 2. 
 37.  Thomas Wayde Pittman, The Road to the Establishment of the International Residual 
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 797, 798–99 (2011).  
 38.  Reiger, supra note 2, at 2. 
 39.  Briefing paper from Marieke Wierda and Caitlin Reiger of ICTJ’s Criminal Justice Pro-
gram to the ICTJ and the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, Closing the International 
and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals: Mechanisms to Address Residual Issues, INT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 4 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-
Global-Tribunal-Residual-2010-English.pdf [hereinafter Closing the International and Hybrid 
Criminal Tribunals]. 
 40.  Gabriel Oosthuizen and Robert Schaeffer, Complete justice: Residual functions and po-
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purpose for establishing a residual mechanism “is to ensure that the 
closing of the Tribunals will not result in impunity for those ‘responsi-
ble for serious violations of international humanitarian law.’”41 Residual 
mechanisms have the potential “to create a safe space within which 
those traumatized by their experiences may overcome them.”42 
Since the international community has undertaken the responsibil-
ity to establish such institutions, it also has the responsibility of closing 
them. As the Honourable Justice Shireen Avis Fisher, President of the 
SCSL, stated, “residual responsibilities are not an afterthought or bur-
den. They are an essential part of the ongoing struggle against impunity: 
to insure that witnesses continue to be protected, archives continue to be 
preserved, and the supervision of persons convicted by the Special 
Court continue to meet international standards.”43 
The majority of residual functions will involve some combination 
of judicial, registry, defense, and prosecutorial activities.44 Judicial func-
tions include activities performed by judicial officers “with the authority 
to make legal assessments and issue binding decisions . . . .”45 The regis-
tries’ functions include “administer[ing] and servic[ing] the courts;” this 
also includes the components of the prosecution and the defense.46 The 
registries are responsible for a broad range of activities such as provid-
ing witness protection services, managing issues with personnel, provid-
ing security and language services, operating as the court’s channel of 
communication, and managing records.47 The residual function work-
load is likely to be the heaviest right after the court closes, but it will 
 
tential residual mechanisms of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 48, 50 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/HJJ-JJH/Vol_3(1)/Residual_functions_EN.pdf. 
 41.  See Catherine Denis, Critical Overview of Residual Functions’ of the Mechanisms and 
its Date of Commencement (including Transitional Arrangements), 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 819, 
822 (2011) (citing Security Council’s resolutions establishing the ICTY S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/808 (February 22, 1993), and the Security Council’s Resolution establishing the ICTR, 
S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (August 28, 2003); see also the resolution establishing the 
IRMCT S.C. Res. 1966, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (December 22, 2010). 
 42.  Leila Nadya Sadat, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
WHITNEY R. HARRIS WORLD LAW INSTITUTE 1, 18 (July 3, 2012), 
http://law.wustl.edu/harris/documents/ICTRLecture-LegacyAd%20HocTribunals9.12.12.pdf. 
 43.  Tenth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (June 2012‒
May 2013), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=G5p0a%2fK95Sc%3d&tabid=176 
[hereinafter Tenth Annual Report]. 
 44.  Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 51-52. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
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decrease with time.48 
Due to the temporary nature of ad hoc tribunals, residual mecha-
nisms are necessary to review proceedings and new evidence or try sus-
pects years after cases have been closed.49 This function is essential to 
preserving an international tribunal’s legacy. Without it, human rights 
violators could simply wait out the charges against them, which “risk[s] 
reinforcing impunity and undermining efforts to re-establish the rule of 
law.”50 A recent example occurred on January 2013 when a French 
Court ruled in favour of a Rwandan extradition request for genocide 
suspect, Innocent Musabyimana.51 Such mechanisms are also important 
for transferring prosecutorial duties and classified documents to the na-
tional level, assuring that the witness protection programs continue, 
preventing future human rights violations, protecting the rights of the 
accused, and overseeing the establishment of public archives.52 Residual 
mechanisms also serve to handle any appellate proceedings that may 
arise after the closure of the court.53 
Effective residual mechanisms not only have an impact on that 
specific tribunal or court’s work, but also on other institutions’ work. 
For instance, witnessing a court’s failure to effectively ensure the pro-
tection of its victims and witnesses will likely discourage others from 
engaging in the work of other international courts such as the ICC.54 
Correspondingly, such residual mechanisms are also connected to the 
court’s legacy in that they are a way for the court to be remembered.55 
C.  Legacy Considerations 
Legacy issues are not easy to define; there have been questions as 
to what stage these issues should be addressed, how to assess their com-
pletion and success, and who would have the responsibility for carrying 
them out.56 There has also been some debate as to whether legacy issues 
 
 48.  Oosthuizen, supra note 30, at 5. 
 49.  See Reiger, supra note 2, at 2. 
 50.  Id. at 2. 
 51.  Rwanda: French Court Grants Rwandan Extradition Request, HIRONDELLE NEWS 
AGENCY (Jan. 30, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/201301310074.html.  
 52.  Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 39, at 5-6. 
 53.  The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY), http://www.icty.org/sid/10874 (last visited July 18, 2014).  
 54.  Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 52. 
 55.  Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last 
visited July 18, 2014). 
 56.  Gabriel Oosthuizen, The Residual Functions of the UN International Criminal Tribu-
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extend beyond completion and residual issues.57 “At the core of legacy 
should be the concept of sustainability—how to maxim[z]e international 
interventions in the aftermath of mass atrocities and make a permanent 
contribution to a country’s capacity to try massive crimes.”58 An inter-
national court’s or tribunal’s capacity and strength in preventing human 
rights violations, protecting witnesses, and performing duties involved 
in transferring cases will partially determine its legacy.59 
A conservative approach to legacy planning focuses a court’s en-
ergy on strengthening the rule of law with an emphasis on enhancing 
national capacity.60 Courts enhance national capacity by employing the 
“demonstration effect.”61 This refers to the role an international tribunal 
or court plays in demonstrating by example and contributes to a cultural 
shift “through increased rights awareness and increased calls for ac-
countability.”62 The conservative approach prioritizes transferring 
knowledge “between international and national staff [as well as] train-
ing and facilitating legal reform.63 While this approach seeks to create a 
cultural shift and increase human rights awareness, it does not empha-
size the need to directly interact with the affected community.64 
Alternatively, a broader approach to legacy, mainly supported by 
civil society, places a greater emphasis on facilitating the path towards 
reconciliation through direct interaction with the public.65 Some activi-
ties under this broader conception of legacy include: “preserving public 
records and materials for posterity;” promoting the long-term positive 
impact of the courts’ work; outreaching to affected communities and 
explaining the court’s work; and developing and reaffirming the rule of 
law through enhancing human and institutional capacities.66 Generally, 
 
nals of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the Potential 
Role of the International Criminal Court ¶ 19 (Int’l Criminal Law Servs., Open Soc’y Justice Ini-
tiative, Briefing Paper, 2008) [hereinafter The residual functions of the UN International Crimi-
nal tribunals].  
 57.  Oosthuizen, supra note 30, at 5. 
 58.  Vincent, supra note 4, at 154. 
 59.  Gabrielle McIntyre, The International Residual Mechanism and the Legacy of Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 926 
(2011).   
 60.  The main proponents of this approach are the entities financing the court, such as the 
United Nations or the national government. Cole, supra note 22. 
 61.  Vincent, supra note 4, at 153. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Cole, supra note 22. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See generally id. 
 66.  Oosthuizen, supra note 30, at 5. 
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such an approach does not view legacy in terms of legal accomplish-
ments and successful prosecutions, but in terms of reconciliation and 
transitional justice. 
The Preamble to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding document, 
supports this conception of legacy, by stating that “grave crimes threat-
en the peace, security and well-being of the world,” it is evident that the 
ICC recognizes the interdependent relationship between accountability 
and stability.67 The Preamble also states that the ICC was established “to 
put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes. . . . for the sake of present 
and future generations;” this implies that in addition to its prosecutorial 
function, another one of the ICC’s roles is to affect future conduct.68 
Some argue that the ICC should play an even greater role in restorative 
and transitional justice “by promoting issues like reconciliation, which 
also contributes to restoration.”69 This approach also finds support in 
some of the founding documents of the ICC’s predecessors. For exam-
ple, the statute establishing the ICTR states that the intention of the 
court was to contribute to “the process of national reconciliation and to 
the restoration and maintenance of peace” by ensuring redress for the 
most serious violations.70 
Another measure of the court’s legacy is “the extent to which they 
have contributed to public perceptions and debates about events that 
took place during the conflict.”71 It should be recognized that there is a 
connection and overlapping purposes for residual mechanisms and lega-
cy strategies. For example, a U.N. Secretary-General’s report noted that 
the “primary use of the archives of a tribunal will be not just for the re-
sidual mechanisms that succeed them, but also for national authorities 
that may seek to conduct further investigations.”72 That report also 
“acknowledges that there is an important secondary value of preserving 
archives ‘for memory, education, and research.’”73 Ultimately, the lega-
cy of an international court or tribunal should “lay the groundwork for 
 
 67.  Cole, supra note 22 (citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 126, 
July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1068 (1998)). 
 68.  Jeremy Sarkin, Enhancing the Legitimacy, Status, and the Role of the International 
Criminal Court Globally by Using Transactional Justice and Restorative Justice Strategies, 6 
INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 83, 86 (2011-2012).  
 69.  Id. at 90. 
 70.  Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 39, at 4 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 71.  Reiger, supra note 2, at 5. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. 
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future efforts to prevent a recurrence of crimes by offering precedents 
for legal reform, building faith in judicial processes, and promoting 
greater civic engagement on issues of accountability and justice.”74 
 
III.  AD HOC CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA 
LEONE 
The last decade of the twentieth century experienced major ad-
vancements in international criminal justice with regards to the creation 
and establishment of ad hoc criminal tribunals and hybrid criminal tri-
bunals such as the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL.75 While the ICTY, 
ICTR, and the SCSL are all unique, one common feature stands: each is 
an ad hoc institution created specifically to address a particular situa-
tion.76 The SCSL was the first of the three to complete its mandate.77 
The ICTY and the ICTR are expected to complete their mandates in the 
next two years. The SCSL had the benefit of learning from the critiques 
of the ICTY and the ICTR, thus this note primarily focus on its legacy 
preservation activities. However, a short discussion of the ICTY and the 
ICTR will explain some of issues that the ICC will face in shaping a 
legacy strategy.78 
A.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
1. Historical Background and Completion Strategy of the ICTY 
Beginning in 1991, political developments in what used to be the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resulted in a number of violent 
conflicts and widespread violations of international criminal law com-
mitted against civilians such as deportations, mass executions, ethnic 
cleansing, mass sexual assaults, and rapes.79 
 
 74.  Id. at 1. 
 75.  See Sarkin, supra note 68, at 85. 
 76.  Hybrid Courts, PROJECT ON INT’L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, http://www.pict-
pcti.org/courts/hybrid.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).  
 77.  Special Court for Sierra Leone: Its History and Jurisprudence, SPECIAL COURT FOR 
SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited July 18, 2014).  
 78.  For an in depth discussion on the ICTY’s legacy, see Guido Acquaviva, ‘Best Before 
Date Shown’: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 507-36 (Bert Zwart, Alexander Zahar & 
Göran Sluiter eds., 2011). For an in-depth discussion on the ICTR’s legacy, see Cecile Aptel, 
Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Completion Strategy and Residual 
Issues, 14 NEW ENG. J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 169-85 (2008).  
 79.  ROBERT CRYER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
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The U.N. Security Council created the ICTY in 1993 when the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia was still underway.80 The ICTY was 
designed to contribute to “the restoration and maintenance of peace” by 
ensuring redress for the most serious violations.81 The court tried four 
types of crimes: genocide; crimes against humanity; violations of the 
laws and customs of war; and grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions.82 
By the end of 2013, the ICTY indicted 161 persons in total and 
concluded 141 cases.83 There were ongoing proceedings for twenty of 
the accused – sixteen before the appeals chamber, and four at the trial 
level.84 The ICTY had sentenced seventy-four people—seventeen of 
whom were transferred, fifty of whom served their sentences, and three 
who died while serving their sentences.85 In addition, the court trans-
ferred thirteen individuals to countries in the former Yugoslavia for trial 
pursuant to Rule 11 bis, and enforced sentences in thirteen different 
states.86 Thirty-six of the accused either had their indictments withdrawn 
or died.87 
It was not until seven years after the ICTY was established that it 
seriously began to discuss how it would conclude its work.88 Two years 
later, in 2002, the ICTY President Claude Jorda submitted the first 
ICTY completion strategy with plans for the ICTY to complete its man-
date by 2010.89 Subsequently, in 2003, the Security Council adopted a 
resolution to treat the completion strategies of the ICTY and the ICTR 
jointly, calling on both courts “to take all possible measures to complete 
investigations by the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities at first 
 
PROCEDURE 122 (2d. ed. 2010). 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 39, at 4.  
 82.  Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/11186 (last updated Feb. 2014) [hereinafter Info-
graphic: ICTY Facts & Figures].  
 83.  Key Figures of the Cases, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/24 (last updated Aug. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Key Figures 
of the Cases].  
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, supra note 82. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE 41 (2006). 
 89.  Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad Hoc 
International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 142-43 (2005) [hereinafter The Judicial 
Effects of the “Completion Strategies”]. 
GOZANI_FINAL_FOR_PUB 4/4/2015  12:55 PM 
344 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 36:331 
 
instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all work by 2010.”90 A 
year later, after the two Presidents of the tribunals “hinted that there 
might be difficulties in fully respecting the dates set out in the comple-
tion strategy, the Security Council adopted another resolution,” Resolu-
tion 1534, to reaffirm the importance of the completion date.91 
In adopting Resolution 1534, the Security Council established new 
requirements for the leadership of the ICTY and the ICTR.92 First, ICTY 
and ICTR prosecutors were required to review their caseloads “with a 
view to determining which cases should be proceeded with and which 
should be transferred to competent national jurisdictions.”93 Second, the 
tribunals were to focus new indictments on “the most senior leaders 
suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the relevant Tribunal.”94 Third, the Security Council required status re-
ports on the progress of the tribunals’ implementation of the completion 
strategies.95 While dates were set, some argued that these were merely 
targets, not deadlines; there were too many variables, such as plea 
agreements and the arrival of fugitives, to make hard predictions.96 
Due to the completion strategy, the judges of the ICTY executed 
two amendments to the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.97  
First, Rule 11 bis was amended so that ICTY cases could be transferred 
to competent domestic courts.98 Second, Rule 28 was amended to give 
the ICTY judges a role in determining whether a potential indictee is 
‘“senior’ enough to merit indictment by the ICTY.”99 In addition, in or-
der to assist with the completion, the Security Council authorized the 
appointment of ad litem judges.100 Security Council Resolution 1329, 
which amended the Statute, reflected the actions the tribunals needed to 
take in order to “expedite the conclusion of their work at the earliest 
possible date.”101 
 
 90.  S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003). 
 91.  SCHABAS, supra note 88, at 43. 
 92.  See id.  
 93.  S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004). 
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Larry D. Johnson, Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining In-
ternational Human Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 158, 159-61 
(2005). 
 97.  The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies,” supra note 89, at 146. 
 98.  Id.  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  SCHABAS, supra note 88, at 41. 
 101.  Id. 
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Some of the ICTY judges were very critical of the completion 
strategy based on their concerns about the fair trial rights of defend-
ants.102 The primary concern was whether the costliness and need of ex-
pediting a trial would take priority over the defendants’ right to a fair 
trial.103 Some argued that this would be a fatal blow to the ICTY’s lega-
cy.104 Nonetheless, it is evident that the ICTY’s completion strategy led 
to “several procedural innovations and an increased use of documentary 
evidence.”105 
 
2.  Residual Mechanisms for the ICTY 
In December 2008, the UN Secretary General, per the Security 
Council’s request, issued a report ‘“on the possible options’ available to 
establish ad hoc mechanisms to carry out the residual mechanisms;” in 
the report, the Secretary General identified the different functions that 
the mechanisms should fulfil106 such as: trying fugitives, trying con-
tempt cases, protecting witnesses, reviewing judgments, enforcing sen-
tences, referring cases to national jurisdictions, assisting national juris-
dictions, and hosting and maintaining archives.107 On December 22, 
2010, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1966, which estab-
lished the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals 
(IRMCT).108 The IRMCT is meant to be a “temporary and efficient” 
mechanism that will continue the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s “jurisdiction, 
rights and obligations and essential functions.”109 The IRMCT will 
begin before the ICTR and the ICTY complete their outstanding judicial 
work.110 “This ‘overlapping period’ is regulated by the Transitional Ar-
rangements that are annexed to the Resolution.”111 The IRMCT has two 
branches: one for the ICTY and one for the ICTR.112 The IRMCT 
branch for the ICTY, located in The Hague, began its work on July 1, 
 
 102.  CRYER, supra note 79, at 131.  
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id.  
 106.  Reiger, supra note 2, at 3. 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  About The Mechanism, supra note 20. The IRMCT is also sometimes referred to as the 
Mechanism of International Criminal Tribunals (MICT). See, e.g., id. 
 109.  About The Mechanism, supra note 20 (internal quotation omitted).  
 110.  Denis, supra note 41, at 821. 
 111.  Id. (citing S.C. Res. 1966, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010)).  
 112.  Id. 
GOZANI_FINAL_FOR_PUB 4/4/2015  12:55 PM 
346 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 36:331 
 
2013.113 
The IRMCT’s functions can be identified from reading the IRMCT 
statute as a whole. Its functions correspond to those identified by the 
tribunals as well as the functions presented in the U.N. Secretary Gen-
eral’s Report.114 The IRMCT handles appeals proceedings, retrials, trials 
for contempt of the tribunal and false testimony, proceedings for review 
of final judgment, sentence supervision and enforcement, assistance to 
national jurisdictions, and preservation of the management of IRMCT, 
ICTR, and ICTY archives.115 The IRMCT also serves an important func-
tion for accused individuals that are still at large.116 The IRMCT is 
“competent to prosecute ‘the persons indicted by the ICTY or the ICTR 
who are among the most senior leaders suspected of being most respon-
sible for the crimes.’”117 This is essential because without a mechanism 
to handle fugitive trials, one of the Security Council’s main purposes for 
establishing the tribunals would be defeated.118 
Both the ICTY and the ICTR have sections dedicated to victims 
and witnesses.119 These sections are in charge of developing long-term 
plans for witnesses afraid of retaliation, recommending to judges the 
adoption of protection and security measures, and “providing physical 
and psychological rehabilitation support services.”120 The IRMCT will 
be tasked with continuing the witness protection programs.121 
The ICTY “transferred the records and archives management func-
tion to the [Residual] Mechanism” on July 1, 2012.122 One year later, the 
Mechanism was transferred particular judicial and prosecutorial func-
tions such as supervising and enforcing the sentencing process, handling 
“assistance requests from national authorities, and . . . protect[ing] . . . 
victims and witnesses in closed cases and . . . cases where a witness is 
 
 113.  About The Mechanism, supra note 20. 
 114.  Denis, supra note 41, at 820 (citing S.C. Res. 258, U.N. Doc. S/RES/258 (May 21, 
2009)). 
 115.  About The Mechanism, supra note 20.  
 116.  Denis, supra note 41, at 823. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Denis, supra note 41, at 822. 
 119.  Oosthuizen, supra note 30, at 52. 
 120.  Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 52. 
 121.  About The Mechanism supra note 20. 
 122.  President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Assessment and Re-
port of Judge Theodor Meron in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of the Security Council Resolution 
1534 (2004) and covering the period from May 24-Nov. 18, 2013, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. S/2013/678 
(Nov. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Assessment and Report of UN Security Council Resolution 1534]. 
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relevant” to the ICTY’s and the Mechanism’s judicial activities.”123 The 
ICTY continues to provide administrative support services to the Mech-
anism.124 
Establishing the IRMCT was essential to not only put the comple-
tion strategies of the two tribunals into motion, but also to begin pre-
serving and building a legacy for both the ICTY and the ICTR.125 Both 
Tribunals continue to help draft the Mechanism’s regulatory framework 
for the provision of judicial services, which has helped eliminate the 
need for a separate regulatory framework.126 The hope is that with the 
IRMCT generating its successful record, “the meaning of ‘legacy’ of the 
ad hoc tribunals may come full circle to be understood once again in its 
initial two-fold sense: both as a message of how each tribunal will be 
remembered, and as its residual functions connotation.”127 
3.  Legacy Considerations for the ICTY 
While the ultimate goal is for the impact of a court’s work to con-
tinue after its conclusion, the ad hoc criminal tribunals’ legacy has not 
always been positive.128 Tensions exist within the international commu-
nity about the ad hoc courts’ “ability to focus on an area that is outside 
their primary mandate and the pressure on the tribunals to maximize 
time and efficiency.”129 “The ICTY was the “first special tribunal.”130 
Located in The Hague, the ICTY’s distance from the affected popula-
tions was not given sufficient consideration in the tribunal’s early years, 
“which allowed local actors to distort matters.”131 Eventually, the ICTY 
tried to rectify the issue by establishing various outreach programs.132 
Some argue that ICTY’s overall connotation remains negative.133 
According to “[t]he only comprehensive country-by-country survey re-
 
 123.  Id. ¶ 56. 
 124.  Id. ¶ 65. 
 125.  About The Mechanism, supra note 20. 
 126.  Assessment and Report of UN Security Council Resolution 1534, supra note 122, ¶ 57. 
 127.  Pittman, supra note 37, at 817. 
 128.  Sarkin, supra note 68, at 96; see Reiger, supra note 2, at 4. 
 129.  Reiger, supra note 2, at 4. 
 130.  International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/international-criminal-tribunals-and-special-
courts/international-criminal-tribunal-for-yugoslavia.html (last visited March 16, 2014) [hereinaf-
ter GLOBAL POLICY FORUM]. 
 131.  CRYER, supra note 79, at 135. 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Kristin Xueqin Wu, Experiences that Count: A Comparative Study of the ICTY and 
SCSL in Shaping the Image of Justice, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 60, 62 (2013)(Neth.). 
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garding the attitudes towards the ICTY carried out in 2002 by the Inter-
national Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),” the 
greater the number of accused that came from an ethnic community, the 
more negatively the ICTY was viewed in those regions.134 The ICTY 
has also come under scrutiny for being “politicized, biased, unfair, and 
very costly. . . . critics question[ed] the tribunal’s ability to ease tensions 
and promote reconciliation” in the regions.135 
There is also a perception that the ICTY’s impact was ultimately 
legal and judicial.136 One proponent of this view is Professor Ljubo 
Bavcon, who noted that: 
Although in many respects the ICTY undoubtedly represented 
an important step forward in the development of international 
law, the idea that it could create peace and security in the re-
gion was utopian and unrealistic. So there is no doubt that the 
creation of the tribunal did more for international justice and 
international criminal law generally than for the former-
Yugoslavia.137 
Opponents to this view contend that the ICTY’s true legacy runs 
much deeper. According to Petar Finci, Senior Information Assistant for 
the ICTY, although the Tribunal is conscious of its negative image: 
[T]here is not too much we can do to change minds and 
hearts. . . . Historical experience from the Nuremberg trials 
shows that only the second generation, who are untouched by 
the violence, can start to face these trials objectively. However, 
that day will come; we have hope for the future generation, and 
much of our work now focuses on leaving a legacy for the fu-
ture generation. Obviously there are mistakes: we have no 
precedence to follow, and most of the time we are inventing 
“rulebooks” ourselves. However, we believe that the work of 
this Tribunal is best accessed in the future. We play for the 
long run.138 
The major hurdle and damage to the ICTY’s legacy can partially 
be traced to the lack of planning and lack of focus on early and compre-
hensive outreach. The ICTY’s outreach program was not established 
 
 134.  Id. at 62 n.6. 
 135.  GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, supra note 130. 
 136.  Frédéric Mégret, The Legacy of the ICTY as Seen Through Some of its Actors and Ob-
servers, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 1011, 1047 (2011).  
 137.  Id.  
 138.  Wu, supra note 133, at 62. 
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until six years after the Tribunal was established.139 As the former presi-
dent of the ICTY, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, explained, “there 
was a need—a necessity, really—for the Tribunal to do more: to actual-
ly communicate with the people of the former Yugoslavia living hun-
dreds of miles away from the Tribunal that had been established for 
their benefit.”140 
During the beginning of the ICTY’s outreach program, the Tribu-
nal took a passive approach by simply providing information about the 
trial at its field offices rather than actively distributing the infor-
mation.141 The outreach program also tended to focus its efforts on “le-
gal scholars and local elites” instead of reaching out to the general pop-
ulation.142 As a result, some perceive the ICTY’s outreach as insufficient 
to have an actual impact.143 The ICTY’s outreach even acknowledged 
that its events “confirmed the need for further ICTY engagement on the 
community level to disseminate the information on the established facts 
as part of the legacy effort.”144 
Recently, the ICTY has been working with local authorities and in-
ternational partners to establish information centers in the former Yugo-
slavia.145 Since 2010, the outreach program has increased its efforts.146 
‘The ICTY has also created a partnership with the United Nations Inter-
regional Crime and Justice Research Institute, and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) field operations in Bel-
grade, Podgorica, Pristina, Sarajevo, Skopje, and Zagre to facilitate ac-
tivities to support the Tribunal’s legacy, such as training lawyers and 
judges in the former Yugoslavia.147 While the project’s focus is to trans-
fer “knowledge and materials from the ICTY to legal professionals in 
national jurisdictions,” it has also undertaken the task of “transcribing 
ICTY proceedings into local languages,” which is very important in ed-
ucating the public at large.148 
Ultimately, the ICTY’s full accounting of all 161 indicted individ-
 
 139.  Id. at 63. 
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 70. 
 143.  Id. at 63-64. 
 144.  ICTY Outreach Activities 2007, ICTY, http://icty.org/sid/10128 (last visited Dec. 25, 
2013).  
 145.  Assessment and Report of UN Security Council Resolution 1534, supra note 122, ¶ 69. 
 146.  Wu, supra note 133, at 64. 
 147.  Assessment and Report of UN Security Council Resolution 1534, supra note 122, ¶ 68; 
Sarkin, supra note 68, at 96. 
 148.  Sarkin, supra note 68, at 96. 
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uals significantly symbolizes the success of international justice ef-
forts.149 It sets an example for other tribunals by indicting individuals 
from all sides of the conflict.150 Moreover, as stated by ICTY Judge 
G.K. McDonald: 
The judgments of the Tribunals do more than determine the 
guilt or innocence of the accused. They do more than establish 
a historical record of what transpired. They do more than inter-
pret international humanitarian law. Rather, the judgments of 
the Tribunals are evidence of actual enforcement of interna-
tional norms. This is the best proof that the numerous conven-
tions, protocols, and resolutions affirming human dignity are 
more than promises. Rather, the rule of law is an important 
component of the peace process.151 
Before the ICTY was established, international criminal law was 
rarely used.152 “Despite its shortfalls, the tribunal . . . [was] instrumental 
in the creation of the first permanent international criminal court.”153 
Importantly, for the purposes of legacy planning, the fact that both the 
ICTY and the ICTR are physically located at a large distance from the 
affected communities foreshadows some of the issues the ICC may need 
to address. 
B.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
1.  ICTR’s Historical Background and Completion Strategy 
The factors that gave rise to the Rwandan Genocide have roots go-
ing back to the colonization of Rwanda.154 Ethnic tensions erupted be-
tween Hutus, who were the majority of the population, and Tutsis, who 
had previously been favored by the colonizers.155 In April 1994, the day 
after extremists allegedly shot down the plane carrying the presidents of 
Rwanda and Burundi, violence in Rwanda erupted.156 The Rwandan 
Armed Forces (FAR) and armed government-trained civilian militias set 
 
 149.  Id. ¶ 72. 
 150.  Sadat, supra note 42, at 14. 
 151.  Agnieszka Szpak, Legacy of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals in Implement-
ing International Humanitarian Law, 4 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCI. 529 (2013). 
 152.  Sarkin, supra note 68, at 86.  
 153.  GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, supra note 130. 
 154.  Rwanda: A Historical Chronology, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html (last visited July 21, 2014). 
 155.  Id. 
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up roadblocks and makeshift security checkpoints where they massa-
cred Tutsis and moderate Hutus.157 Encouraged by mass media, ordinary 
civilians “hunted down and killed their neighbors and friends.”158 De-
spite the ongoing violence, U.N. forces stood by as the slaughter con-
tinued and were forbidden to intervene because it would breach their 
“monitoring” mandate.159 On April 8, 1994, the Rwandese Patriotic 
Front (RPF), a Tutsi-dominated organization, launched a major offen-
sive to end the genocide and “rescue 600 of its troops surrounded in Ki-
gali.”160 However, several months later, conflicting accounts from U.N. 
agencies reported that RPF troops carried out “a series of reprisal kill-
ings,” executing several hundred civilians.161 “Over the course of one 
hundred days, more than eight hundred thousand ethnic Tutsis, Twas, or 
moderate Hutus were the victims of genocide in Rwanda.”162 
In 1994, the U.N. Security Council created the ICTR in 1994163 and 
decided to locate the seat of the ICTR in Arusha, United Republic of 
Tanzania, a neighboring country, because of security concerns.164 The 
ICTR was designed to contribute to “the process of national reconcilia-
tion and to the restoration and maintenance of peace” by ensuring re-
dress for the most serious violations.165 It had jurisdiction over war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.166 While the ICTR was 
given an initial four-year mandate, the U.N. did not set a deadline for 
the court to finish its work.167 It was, however, understood that as an ad 
hoc international tribunal with a mandate limited to grave crimes com-
mitted in Rwanda in 1994, the ICTR’s lifespan would be relatively 
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CTR. FOR ETHICS, JUSTICE, AND PUB. LIFE 1, 1 (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/Legacy_of_ICTR_in_Africa_ICEJPL.pd
f. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/808 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 165.  Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 39, at 4 n.14.  
 166.  CRYER, supra note 79, at 136. 
 167.  Aptel, supra note 78, at 169–70.  
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short.168 
As time passed, the ICTR’s budget increased while the attitudes 
and priorities of U.N. member-states shifted; the international commu-
nity voiced frustration with the tribunal’s efficiency and ability to suc-
cessfully achieve its mandate.169 This frustration led to increased pres-
sure on ICTR officials to complete the tribunal’s work.170 Similar to the 
ICTY, the ICTR was also slow to begin its outreach work; in 2000, an 
“info point” was opened in Kigali where information about the trials as 
well as court proceedings broadcasts were made publicly available, the 
ICTR also developed a Kinyarwanda section in its website which trans-
lated key decisions into Kinyarwanda.171 
The ICTR is currently wrapping up its work and does not have any 
cases in progress.172 It has completed a total of seventy-five cases, which 
include eleven pending appeals and twelve acquittals; it also transferred 
ten cases to two national jurisdictions, France and Rwanda.173 So far, 
seven individuals have been released after completing their sentences, 
two detainees died before judgment, and nine accused individuals are 
still at large.174 Recently, the ICTR announced that all but one of its ap-
peals would be concluded in 2013 and 2014.175 
Regarding its completion strategy, the ICTR moved slower than 
the ICTY.176 After the ICTY announced its completion strategy, the 
U.N. urged the ICTR to formulate a completion strategy and a plan to 
transfer cases to competent national courts.177 The ICTR presented the 
first draft of its completion strategy to the U.N. in July 2003.178 Similar 
 
 168.  Id. at 170.   
 169.  Aptel, supra note 78, at 170.  
 170.  Id.  
 171.  COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 65 (Nicholas Waddell 
& Phil Clark eds., 2008). 
 172.  Status of Cases, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Status of Cases, supra note 172, at 1. 
 175.  President of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, Letter dated Nov. 13, 2013 
from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2013/663 (Nov. 13, 2013). 
 176.  SCHABAS, supra note 88, at 42. 
 177.  The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies,” supra note 89, at 144. 
 178.  Eighth Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Per-
sons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Oth-
er Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 
December 1994, Annex ¶ 2, 2003, U.N. Doc. A/58/140-S/2003/707 (July 11, 2003) [hereinafter 
Eighth Annual ICTR Report].   
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to ICTY, Security Council Resolution 1503 provided the same timetable 
for the ICTR’s completion.179 The completion strategy was later ex-
panded by Security Council Resolution 1534 for the ICTY and the 
ICTR in order to review its’ caseloads and decide which cases could be 
tried by domestic courts.180 Rwanda, France, the Netherlands, and Nor-
way had all agreed to accept cases.181 In particular, there was initial reti-
cence in the idea of transferring cases to Rwanda due to doubts on the 
condition of the Rwandan prisons and whether the court could provide 
fair trials.182 Despite operating at a slow pace due to delays, in part due 
to the large number of people awaiting trial, cases were transferred 
nonetheless.183 
According to the completion strategy report for the ICTR, present-
ly, the “Tribunal has completed all work at the trial level . . . disposed of 
all referral applications, and has successfully concluded all evidence 
preservation hearings.”184 To date, all that remain are appeals cases.185 
Most of the ICTR’s judicial functions have already been transferred to 
the Residual Mechanism, with the first Residual Mechanism appeal un-
der way.186 In addition, “the transition of administrative services is on-
going and . . . expected to be complete by the end of 2014.”187 The ICTR 
has also begun the transfer of the Tribunal’s records and archives to the 
Residual Mechanism.188 
2.  Residual Mechanisms for the ICTR 
As previously mentioned, on December 22, 2010, the U.N. Securi-
ty Council issued Resolution 1966, which established the International 
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT).189 According to 
the IRMCT’s First Annual Report, “[i]n establishing the Mechanism, 
 
 179.  CRYER, supra note 79, at 139.  
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Aptel, supra note 78, at 177-78.  
 182.  See id. at 139–40. 
 183.  JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-05.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).  
 184.  Report on the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(as of Nov. 5, 2013), ¶ 76, U.N. Doc., S/2013/663 (Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Report on the 
Completion Strategy of the ICTR]. 
 185.  Id.  
 186.  Id. ¶¶ 6, 76.   
 187.  The Registrar Meets the Senegalese President, ICTR NEWSLETTER (Oct.-Dec. 2013), 
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CNews%5CNewsletter%5COct-Dec2013.pdf.  
 188.  Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR, supra note 184, at ¶ 76. 
 189.  The IRMCT is also sometime referred to as the Mechanism of International Criminal 
Tribunals (MICT). About The Mechanism, supra note 21.  
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the Security Council emphasized that it should be “a small, temporary 
and efficient structure whose functions and size would diminish over 
time.”190 The residual mechanism for the ICTR is located in Arusha, 
Tanzania and began functioning on July 1, 2012.191 Pursuant to Resolu-
tion 1966, the IRMCT will have jurisdiction over three of the nine indi-
viduals indicted by the ICTR for their participation in the genocide who 
are still at large.192 The other six “have been referred to Rwanda,” but 
the IRMCT will continue to “assist with tracking efforts” for those cas-
es.193 
The Mechanism has been mandated for a period of four years with 
subsequent periods of two years following progress reviews.194 The 
Arusha branch is currently operating out of the same locations as the 
ICTR, but is expected to move to its new premises in 2016. The Gov-
ernment of Tanzania has provided the land and connection to facilities 
at no cost.195 Beyond the Mechanism’s technical tasks devoted to the ar-
chives, relocating acquitted persons, monitoring proceedings in Rwan-
da, and trying of fugitives, it will be critical for the Mechanism to facili-
tate “development assistance and promote capacity building and 
educational programs to ensure that the legacy of accountability and 
peace takes hold.”196 
According to its first annual report, the Mechanism has continued 
to provide the same level of witness support and protection services 
while streamlining the process.197 The unit “handled protection issues 
not only in Rwanda but also in the Great Lakes region, from urban cen-
ters to refugee camps.”198 This has included taking surveys among the 
witnesses to try to improve its efficiency and to ensure that witnesses 
are receiving the services.199 “In addition, it has “developed strategies 
that are currently being implemented to further strengthen the manage-
ment and safekeeping of confidential witness information.”200 
 
 190.  First Annual Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, ¶ 
7, U.N. Doc. A/68/219-S/2013/464 (Aug. 2, 2013) [hereinafter First Annual Report of the Inter-
national Mechanism].   
 191.  About The Mechanism, supra note 21. 
 192.  Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR, supra note 184, ¶ 5.   
 193.  Id.  
 194.  First Annual Report of the International Mechanism, supra note 190, ¶ 7. 
 195.  Id. ¶ 27. 
 196.  Sadat, supra note 42, at 14. 
 197.  First Annual Report of the International Mechanism, supra note 190, ¶ 61. 
 198.  Id. ¶ 62. 
 199.  Id. ¶ 61. 
 200.  Id.  
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In October 2012, the IRMCT issued its first appeal decision that 
upheld a decision of the ICTR to transfer the case of Phénéas Munyar-
garma to Rwanda.201 In reaching its decision, the Appeals Chamber stat-
ed that the IRMCT’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence re-
flect normative continuity with those of the ICTY and ICTR. According 
to the Appeals Chamber, “these parallels are not simply a matter of 
convenience or efficiency but serve to uphold principles of due process 
and fundamental fairness, which are the cornerstones of international 
justice.”202 
3.  Legacy Considerations for the ICTR 
The ICTR’s mandate was to render justice and contribute to recon-
ciliation.203 From the beginning, there was concern that this mandate 
was broad, and some had argued that it was based on a false premise 
that criminal trials could contribute to the reconciliation of society.204 
There were also concerns that the ICTR was both “geographically and 
metaphorically too distant from the people of Rwanda, who remain for 
the most part uniformed about unaffected by the Tribunal.”205 
Since the ICTR was limited by a temporal jurisdiction restricted to 
crimes committed in 1994, the acts of planning the crimes were exclud-
ed from prosecution.206 Additionally, the prosecution’s policy to focus 
on the highest-level perpetrators was difficult for victims to accept.207 
The prosecution was also criticized for being biased due to the lack of 
public indictments of the RPF for alleged crimes, which “may fuel a 
sense of impunity among members of the current government and lead 
to continued instability in the region, as well as contribute to a feeling 
of persecution among Hutus.”208 
All these facts have potentially undermined the legacy of the 
ICTR. There have been arguments that the ICTR’s primary contribution 
has been in the area of international jurisprudence at the expense of de-
 
 201.  Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) Issues First Appeal Decision 
Upholding a Decision of the ICTR to transfer the Case Phénéas Munyargarma to Rwanda, 
UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNALS (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.unmict.org/en/news/mechanism-international-criminal-tribunals-mict-issues-first-
appeal-decision-upholding-decision [hereinafter MICT Issues First Appeal Decision]. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Nov, 8, 1994). 
 204.  Aptel, supra note 78, at 185. 
 205.  CRYER, supra note 79, at 122. 
 206.  Aptel, supra note 78, at 186-87.  
 207.  Id. at 187.  
 208.  Sadat, supra note 42, at 16. 
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livering justice to the genocide survivors in Rwanda.209 Unfortunately, 
there has yet to be a comprehensive survey of the Rwandan general 
population to gauge the impact and contributions of the ICTR.210 Never-
theless, the ICTR was able to contribute to reconciliation in several 
ways. First, a factual account of the genocide was created; second, judi-
cial notice confirming the genocide against the Tutsi ethnic group in 
Rwanda was issued; third, individual criminal responsibility rather than 
group criminalization or stigmatization was established; fourth, almost 
the entire interim government of the Rwanda genocide era was placed 
on trial at the Tribunal; fifth, victims were given a voice to validate their 
experience and suffering; and finally, re-education and communication 
promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law in Rwanda was 
provided.211 
Additionally, on October 2, 1998, the ICTR established the first 
ever conviction of the crime of genocide in an international criminal 
court when it handed down its judgment of Jean-Paul Akayesu, the for-
mer Mayor of Taba commune.212 This determination, resulting from a 
fair and independent judicial process, was essential to establishing a 
clear historical record, assisting with reconciliation, and continuing the 
fight against impunity. 
C.  The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
1.  SCSL’s Historical Background and Completion Strategy 
Since 1991, Sierra Leone suffered a decade long conflict marked 
by systemic and widespread violations of human rights and humanitari-
an law. The rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), entered 
Sierra Leone from neighboring Liberia with the goal of overthrowing 
the government and in its process, committed a multitude of atrocities 
that included recruiting child soldiers, amputating its victims’ limbs, 
torture, the mass raping of women and girls, and also the killing of sev-
eral thousand civilians.213 In 2002, a treaty between the U.N. and the 
 
 209.  Gallimore, supra note 156, at 243. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. at 251. 
 212.  Gallimore, supra note 156, at 241. 
 213.  See generally Summary, in Sierra Leone: Sowing Terror, Atrocities against Civilians in 
Sierra Leone, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Vol. 10, No. 3 (A) (July 1998), 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/sierra/ [hereinafter Sowing Terror]; see also, OPEN JUSTICE 
SOCIETY INITIATIVE, Legacy: Completing the Work of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 2 (2011) 
[hereinafter Legacy: Completing the Work of the Special Court of Sierra Leone].  
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Government of Sierra Leone established the SCSL.214 The treaty granted 
the SCSL: 
[t]he power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest respon-
sibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra 
Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, 
in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment 
of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.215 
In addition to the SCSL’s purpose to bring those who had previ-
ously committed atrocities to justice, it also had “forward looking aims” 
such as “ending impunity, deterring would-be perpetrators, providing a 
measure of justice for the victims, helping to strengthen the rule of law 
in Sierra Leone, and contributing to capacity-building within the coun-
try, particularly for the legal profession.”216  
 
The SCSL was the first of its kind in several ways. It was the first 
of the “hybrid” ad hoc criminal tribunals, meaning it involved both in-
ternational and national law components.217 The U.N. Secretary General 
appointed international judges, which formed a majority, and the Gov-
ernment of Sierra Leone appointed the rest of the judges.218 The SCSL 
applied its own Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but those 
made reference to international instruments and some national laws.219 
The SCSL was also the first court to operate in the country where 
 
 214.  Vincent O. Nmehielle & Charles Chernor Jalloh, The Legacy of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, in FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 107, 107 (Summer 2006). 
 215.  Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1 (Jan. 16, 2002), available 
at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3D&%E2%80%BA [hereinaf-
ter Statute of the Court for Sierra Leone]; Agreement between the United Nations and the Gov-
ernment of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1(1) (Jan. 
16, 2002), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CLk1rMQtCHg%3d&tabid=176 [hereinafter Agreement be-
tween the U.N. and the Government of Sierra Leone]. 
 216.  Alison Smith, The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice, in INTERNATIONALIZED 
CRIMINAL COURTS, SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA, 125, 125 (Cesare 
Romano, André Nollkaemper, & Jann K. Kleffner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004). [hereinafter 
The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice].  
 217.  Id. at 134; see also No Peace Without Justice, Making Justice Count Assessing the im-
pact and legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 1, 1 (Sept. 
2012) http://www.npwj.org/content/Making-Justice-Count-Assessing-impact-and-legacy-Special-
Court-Sierra-Leone-Sierra-Leone-and [hereinafter Impact and Legacy Survey]. 
 218.  CRYER, supra note 79, at 182. 
 219.  Aldo Zammit Borda, Precedent in International Courts and Tribunals, 2 CAMBRIDGE J. 
OF INT. & COMP. L. 287, 297 (2013).  
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the crimes were committed and the first international court to view leg-
acy and outreach as priorities since the early stages of its work.220 All of 
the SCSL trials were held in Sierra Leone with the exception of the 
Charles Taylor trial, which had to be transferred to The Hague due to 
security concerns.221 The SCSL’s outreach program focused on “im-
proving domestic understanding of the court’s activities.”222 The hope 
was that the SCSL could “advance[] the state of international criminal 
justice while strengthening the country’s domestic legal system” so that 
the citizens of Sierra Leona could believe in the process.223 
The establishment of SCSL was a landmark achievement in inter-
national criminal justice. The SCSL “has helped to establish an authori-
tative record of the nature of the crimes that took place during the Civil 
War - who was responsible for them, what groups were targeted, and 
why.”224 In addition to its own success, it provides valuable lessons for 
future courts and the advancement of international criminal justice. The 
SCSL is the first ad hoc, post-Cold War, international tribunal to close225 
and is unique in that it contemplated issues of completion and legacy 
much earlier than the other tribunals. Despite its efforts, those issues did 
not receive the attention they deserved from the SCSL’s political back-
ers, which left the SCSL to devise its own solutions.226 
In order to manage the responsibility of witness protection, the 
SCSL undertook steps to create the first national protection program, 
one of only a few witness protection programs in Africa.227 The Witness 
Protection Unit provides “protection and assistance to witnesses in na-
tional cases, such as organized crime, gender based violence and corrup-
 
 220.  See generally THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, THE RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT 
FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org (last visited on Jan. 25, 2015).  
 221.  Id.  
 222.  Suma, supra note 28, at 1. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  ICTJ, SCSL Holds Valuable Lessons for International Justice, EXPLORING THE LEGACY 
OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, (Nov. 04, 2012), 
http://scsl-legacy.ictj.org/ictj-scsl-holds-valuable-lessons-international-justice; see also Ninth 
Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court of Sierra Le-
one, 1, 37 (June 2011 - May 2012), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ZEDnSBp6ahc%3d&tabid=176; [hereinafter Ninth Annual Re-
port of the President]. 
 225.  Impact and Legacy Survey, supra note 217, at 36. 
 226.  Thierry Cruvellier, From the Taylor Trial to a Lasting Legacy: Putting the Special 
Court Model to the Test, International Center for Transitional Justice and Sierra Leone Court 
Monitoring Programme, 1, 3 (2009), http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-SierraLeone-Taylor-
Trial-2009-English.pdf. 
 227.  Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 38. 
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tion cases.”228 
By the end of 2012, the SCSL had indicted thirteen people and 
convicted nine, “including the first sitting African head of state, [former 
Liberian President] Charles Taylor.”229 In September 2013, the Appeals 
Chambers judges of the Special Court upheld Taylor’s conviction by the 
Trial Chamber in April 2012, concluding the SCSL’s final case.230 Later, 
in December 2013, as part its successful completion of its mandate, the 
SCSL formally handed over the SCSL’s landmark courthouse to the 
Government of Sierra Leone.231 
2.  Residual Mechanisms for the SCSL 
There were serious risks involved in closing the SCSL, just as 
there are risks with closing the other tribunals; however, the residual 
mechanisms that are supported and moulded by the local population and 
civil society can help ensure that the SCSL’s closure leaves a lasting 
legacy in Sierra Leone.232 In contrast to other international criminal tri-
bunals’ residual mechanisms, the Residual Special Court of Sierra Leo-
ne (RSCSL) began its work after the SCSL shut down instead of during 
its last phases.233 RSCSL was set up by an agreement between the U.N. 
and the government of Sierra Leone in August 2010 to address the re-
sidual issues resulting from the closing of the Special Court. The Sierra 
Leone Parliament ratified the agreement in December 2011.234 Accord-
ing to the RSCSL Statute: 
The purpose of the Residual Special Court is to carry out the 
functions of the Special Court for Sierra Leone that must con-
tinue after the closure of the Special Court. To that end, the 
Residual Special Court shall: maintain, preserve and manage 
its archives, including the archives of the Special Court; pro-
vide for witness and victim protection and support; respond to 
 
 228.  Id. at 36. 
 229.  About this Project, EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA 
LEONE, http://scsl-legacy.ictj.org/about-project (last visited Sept. 16, 2014). 
 230.  Alpha Sesay, Charles Taylor’s Conviction and Sentence Upheld: What next for him?, 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MONITOR, A PROJECT OF THE OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE 
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/09/charles-taylors-conviction-and-sentence-
upheld-what-next-for-him/. 
 231.  Special Court Press Release, supra note 16. 
 232.  See generally Cruvellier, supra note 226. 
 233.  Geraldine Coughlan, Much remains to be done in Sierra Leone, INT’L JUSTICE TRIBUNE 
(May 9, 2012), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/much-remains-be-done-sierra-
leone.  
 234.  Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 38. 
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requests for access to evidence by national prosecution authori-
ties; supervise enforcement of sentences; review convictions 
and acquittals; conduct contempt of court proceedings; provide 
defense counsel and legal aid for the conduct of proceedings 
before the Residual Special Court; respond to requests from 
national authorities with respect to claims for compensation; 
and prevent double jeopardy.235 
The RSCSL seat will be seated in Sierra Leone.236 The fact that the 
SCSL is located in the country where its subject crimes were committed 
is advantageous in facilitating its residual mechanisms in several 
ways.237 First, it provides increased accessibility to witnesses and vic-
tims;238 and second, it allows increased visibility of the court’s work.239 
Such a presence creates the possibility that the SCSL’s work “may as-
sist in rebuilding the Sierra Leonean justice system and serve as a sym-
bol against impunity for egregious crimes in the region as a whole;”240 
third, it increases affected communities’ access to the court and its ar-
chives.241 
The RSCSL has the authority to preside over ad hoc judicial pro-
ceedings, such as review proceedings or contempt of court cases arising 
out of witness tampering.242 “It is anticipated that of the 557 witnesses 
who testified [in SCSL proceedings], approximately 100 may require 
ongoing post-trial witness protection or support.243 According to the 
Ninth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, “[t]he RSCSL staff will work closely with the Sierra Leone Po-
lice, in particular the Witness Protection Unit, to ensure that the con-
cerns and needs of witnesses are adequately addressed.”244 
The RSCSL also has jurisdiction to try the case against the SCSL’s 
last remaining fugitive, Johnny Paul Koroma but has the option of refer-
 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at 35 (citing Article 6 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government 
of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone).   
 237.  Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 65. 
 238.  Id. 
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 241.  Valerie Oosterveld, The International Criminal Court and the Closure of the Time-
Limited International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 13, 27 (2010) 
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 243.  Id.  
 244.  Id. 
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ring the case to a competent national authority.245 Upon the closure of 
the SCSL, the SCSL’s archives became the property of the RSCSL and 
are co-located in both Sierra Leone and in the Netherlands, where the 
RSCSL interim seat is located.246 Pursuant to the RSCSL Agreement, 
“in order to preserve and promote the legacy of the Special Court, elec-
tronic access to, and printed copies of, the public archives shall be 
available to the public in Sierra Leone.”247 These archives, which will be 
made available to the public through the Sierra Leone Peace Museum, 
are “one of the richest resources on the nation’s conflict.” 248 The Peace 
Museum will be an independent national institution dedicated to the 
memory of Sierra Leone’s decade-long conflict249 and will include a 
memorial, exhibition, and an archive that will “provide information to 
future generations about the conflict’s history and respect the memory 
of those who suffered during the conflict.”250 
3.  Legacy of the SCSL 
The international community had high expectations for the SCSL, 
expecting this new model of ad hoc tribunal to conduct its business 
more efficiently and economically.251 The new model was designed with 
an “in-country presence, the incorporation of national and international 
staff, a reasonably secure environment, and good state cooperation.”252 
According to Geoffrey Robertson, the first president of the Appeals 
Chamber of the SCSL, “the Court alone ha[d] the power to deliver the 
justice that is a prerequisite for reconciliation.”253 
The SCSL was, however, not without criticism. Some argued that 
the length and the delaying of trials, the 150 million dollar price tag, and 
the court’s limited jurisdiction to only focus on crime starting on No-
vember 30, 1996, all posed as a threat to peace in Sierra Leone. First, 
the delayed initiation of trials was problematic because some of the 
most important indictees and actors involved in the conflict either died 
 
 245.  Id. at 39. 
 246.  Id. at 38. 
 247.  Id. at 36 (citing Article 7.2 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government 
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 249.  Id. at 37.  
 250.  Id. at 5. 
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 252.  Id. at 44. 
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STATE: SIERRA LEONE 2002-2008 43, 50 (Lansana Gberie ed., 2009).  
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or were still unaccounted for by the time the trials began in 2002.254 
Second, the SCSL’s limited jurisdiction has led some to perceive the 
court as Freetown-centric because Freetown and the Western area of Si-
erra Leone only began feeling the war’s impact after 1996.255 Finally, 
some believed that the SCSL criminal prosecutions were a threat to 
peace “and a Western intrusion in African accountability Mecha-
nisms.”256 
Nevertheless, positives of the SCSL generally outweigh the criti-
cisms. The SCSL was able to create a working relationship with the 
State, which was essential to its operation since the SCSL did not have a 
police force of its own to apprehend suspects.257 The SCSL also em-
ployed local judges, lawyers, and investigators who are able to use their 
training to serve Sierra Leone even after the SCSL’s closure.258 The 
SCSL also made great contributions to the jurisprudence of international 
law on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in armed hostilities, the 
criminalisation of forced marriage as a crime against humanity, and at-
tacks on peacekeepers.259 The SCSL established legal precedent that the 
reasons for fighting are immaterial in determining where crimes against 
humanity have been committed; by trying senior officials from all three 
war parties, the SCSL sent the public a message that such crimes would 
not be tolerated regardless of one’s goals or intentions.260 
According to Alison Smith, who previously served as the Chief 
Legal Advisor to the SCSL’s Vice President and is currently the Direc-
tor of No Peace Without Justice’s International Criminal Justice Pro-
 
 254.  Danielle Koehn, An Imperfect Body, 1 UNDERGRADUATE TRANSITIONAL JUST. REV. 
173, 179 (2013). 
 255.  Id. at 184.  
 256.  Id. at 186. (quoting William Schabas, A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court of Sierra Leone, in TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR 
TRUTH, 3, 26 (William Schabas & Shane Darcy eds., 2004). 
 257. Mariana O. Rosenblut, The International Criminal Court on Trial, MAXIMUM AFR. J. 
(Nov. 17, 2013), http://maximumafrica.org/east-africa/international-criminal-court-trial/; see also 
Patricia M. Wald, Apprehending War Criminals: Does International Cooperation Work?, 27 AM. 
U. INT’L REV. 229, 230 (2012). 
 258.  David Tolbert, ICTJ: SCSL Holds Valuable Lessons for International Justice, 
EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE  (Nov. 4, 2012), http://scsl-
legacy.ictj.org/ictj-scsl-holds-valuable-lessons-international-justice. 
 259.  Rosemary Grey, The Hague 2012, in On Mandates, INT’L PEACE AND SECURITY 
INSTITUTE (June 13, 2014), http://ipsinstitute.org/on-mandates/. 
 260.  CRYER, supra note 79, at 184. The SCSL tried members from the Civil Defense Force 
(a defense force set up by the Sierra Leone Government), the RUF, and the Armed Forces Revo-
lutionary Council (AFRC); Suma, supra note 28, at 1. 
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gram, the main thing that the SCSL should be remembered for is its vi-
sion to be an institution established to serve the people of Sierra Leone 
and of Liberia.261 This vision began, according to Smith, when the U.N. 
Security Council agreed with the government of Sierra Leone to place 
the SCSL in Sierra Leone.262 Smith asserts that this vision continued on 
through the entire existence of the SCSL and that other tribunals should 
refer to it when carrying out their own mandates.263 
As stated previously, the SCSL was the first international court to 
view legacy and outreach as priorities from the early stages of its work 
despite “legacy” never being an explicit part of the SCSL’s mandate.264 
Its outreach program educates communities in both Sierra Leone and 
Liberia on the “trials, impunity, and the rule of law” with the goal of 
stimulating informed discussion.265 Since the Special Court’s establish-
ment, the SCSL’s Outreach and Public Affairs Section has sought to 
“provide the greatest possible accessibility” to the SCSL’s activities.266 
The staff, based in Freetown, work with eight Field Officers located in 
the Provinces of Sierra Leone, two staff members in Liberia, and a net-
work of civil society organizations to help inform the local community 
about the SCSL’s trial progress.267 
By prioritizing outreach in the early stages of its work, the SCSL 
established a solid basis for its legacy. The SCSL designated an out-
reach coordinator for each region and school children would learn about 
the history of the conflict and the work that the SCSL was doing every 
Tuesday and Wednesday.268 The Court also used a variety of outreach 
techniques such as utilizing local media, cooperating with NGOs, work-
ing with local organization, and setting up booths at local markets.269 
The SCSL’s outreach program raised awareness about the trials 
and the investigations.270 It also engaged local communities and civil so-
 
 261.  ICTJ’s SCSL Legacy Podcast Series: Alison Smith Discusses the Legacy and Impact of 
the Special Court in Sierra Leone, EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA 
LEONE (Jan. 23, 2013), http://scsl-legacy.ictj.org/ictjs-scsl-legacy-podcast-series-alison-smith 
[hereinafter ICTJ’s SCSL Legacy Podcast Series: Alison Smith]. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Impact and Legacy Survey, supra note 217, at 1. 
 265.  Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 32. 
 266.  Id.  
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Ojielo, supra note 253. 
 269.  Koehn, supra note 254, at 188.   
 270.  WAR DON DON (New Day Films 2010) (see 13:30 for an example of the Special 
Court’s outreach efforts).  
GOZANI_FINAL_FOR_PUB 4/4/2015  12:55 PM 
364 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 36:331 
 
ciety.271 From the beginning stages of the SCSL operations, there was a 
clear priority for “court officials to raise awareness, explain, and get 
support for their work.”272 Due to the relatively low literacy rates in Si-
erra Leone and Liberia, the SCSL made use of video and audio reports 
as a means of disseminating information.273 Indeed, many individuals 
have said that the SCSL’s innovative outreach program will serve as a 
model for future tribunals.274 
The outreach staff also collaborated with civil society groups to 
create a nationwide campaign on the problem of community violence 
and held discussions with youth groups and organizations.275 Other 
mechanisms the outreach staff utilized include: radio discussions and 
call-in programs; “Accountability Now Clubs” for university students in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia; schools visits; year-round trial screening 
summaries; and Special Court interactive forums where approximately 
forty non-governmental organizations meet once a month to discuss the 
court’s latest activities and ask for feedback.276 The SCSL has also made 
“use of traditional methods of information dissemination such as town 
hall meetings in villages and towns.”277 In addition, the buildings and 
grounds were used for the trials and will be used in a way to honor the 
victims and help the process of national healing.278 A survey conducted 
by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) No Peace Without Justice 
and the SCSL indicated that there was a high degree of awareness of the 
SCSL’s activities in both Sierra Leone and Liberia.279 More than 90% of 
overall respondents had heard of the SCSL and nearly 50% of people 
have participated in outreach activities.280 
 
One unique challenge the SCSL faced was the Charles Taylor trial. 
Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1688 (2006), the trial of 
Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia, was held in the Special 
Court’s Hague sub-office.281 The SCSL moved the Charles Taylor trial 
 
 271.  Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 32. 
 272.  Cruvellier, supra note 226, at 28. 
 273.  Id. at 18. 
 274.  Id. at 29. 
 275.  Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 34. 
 276.  Id.   
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Tolbert, supra note 258.  
 279.  Impact and Legacy Survey, supra note 217, at 1. 
 280.  Id.  
 281.  S.C. Res. 1688, at 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1688 (June 16, 2006). 
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due to security concerns in the area.282 The transfer of the Taylor trial 
had a symbolic impact; before the transfer, the court “previously gar-
nered praise for sitting in the country where the crimes” occurred and 
giving the “nationals a significant, if not equal, role in the process.”283 
The Special Court took several measures to try and recreate the 
success that it had with holding the cases in Sierra Leone. For judgment 
in the Charles Taylor trial, the “feed was broadcast[ed] in Krio, with a 
Krio interpreter supplied by the Court Management Section,” this made 
the Charles Taylor judgment accessible to people who were not fluent in 
English.284 In the capital of Liberia, Monrovia, “several radio stations 
and one television station broadcast[ed] the Judgment live.”285 The 
Judgment was also available online via the “Special Court’s website and 
the Open Society Justice Initiative funded ‘Charles Taylor Trial’ web-
site.”286 
However, the outreach efforts were not without their flaws or ob-
stacles. Initially, the SCSL set up two additional centers to broadcast the 
live stream of the proceeding, but due to continuous technical problems, 
they were eventually shut down.287 The Charles Taylor trial was thus 
streamed in only one of the two courtrooms inside the SCSL compound; 
the inaccessibility resulted in few individuals actually watching the tri-
al.288 The SCSL’s website provided a live stream, but it was largely use-
less outside to the court’s premises due to the poor quality of internet 
facilities in Sierra Leone and the regular electricity cuts.289 “Satellite 
communications, upon which the court’s video-link depend[ed] [on], 
[were] subject to climate interference, technical incidents, or lack of fa-
cilities.”290 These limitations were even more pronounced in Liberia.291 
These deficiencies were, to some extent, countered by the SCSL’s Out-
reach Program.292 While these efforts should be commended, the obsta-
cles and failures in the execution of outreach strategies should also 
serve as lessons for future international criminal tribunals. 
The SCSL legacy activities continue to be an essential part of the 
 
 282.  Cruvellier, supra note 226, at 13. 
 283.  Id. at 14. 
 284.  Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 33. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id.   
 287.  Cruvellier, supra note 226, at 15.  
 288.  Id.   
 289.  Id. at 16. 
 290.  Id. at 18. 
 291.  Id. at 16. 
 292.  Id. at 15. 
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court’s operations and should receive continued support from the inter-
national community in order to reach its full potential and preserve its 
legacy.293 Through its various projects, the SCSL has strengthened the 
domestic justice system, served as a model for the rule of law in Sierra 
Leone, and transferred valuable skills and knowledge to Sierra Leonean 
court staff.294 There are, however, still very real risks to the legacy of the 
SCSL, and only time will tell if the SCSL will have the necessary “po-
litical and financial support” from the international community to be-
come truly meaningful.295 
IV.  LESSONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
A.  Historical Overview of the International Criminal Court 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established by treaty, 
the Rome Statute, instead of a U.N. resolution or agreement; as of May 
1, 2013, it has 122 state parties to its statute.296 It is the first permanent 
international court and the first court with global application.”297 “The 
Court is seated in The Hague in the Netherlands298 and is considered a 
“court of last resort . . . based on the principle of complementarity.299 
The principle of complementarity dictates “that the primary responsibil-
ity for exercising jurisdiction over international crimes rests with do-
mestic jurisdictions and that the ICC cannot act unless the country with 
jurisdiction over the case is not investigating, prosecuting, or is ‘unwill-
ing or unable genuinely’ to do so.”300 
Establishing the ICC “is one of the most important developments 
 
 293.  Id. at 45.   
 294.  Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 7. 
 295.  Tolbert, supra note 258. 
 296.  Rome Statute came into force on July 1, 2002, after 66 states ratified it. ICC at a 
Glance, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/Pages/icc%20at%20a%20
glance.aspx; Oosterveld, supra note 241, at 23. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court art. 126, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1068 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Rome Statute]. 
 297.  Cole, supra note 22. 
 298.  About the ICC, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/icc%20at%20a%20glance?la
n=en-GB. 
 299.  INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SERVICES, INTERNATIONAL, HYBRID AND NATIONAL 
COURTS TRYING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 1, 12, available 
at http://wcjp.unicri.it/deliverables/docs/Module_4_International_war_crimes_courts.pdf. 
 300.  Id. 
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in international criminal law.”301 From its inception, the ICC “was envi-
sioned as a body that would preside over only those cases of most seri-
ous concern to the international community as a whole,” namely geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression.302 
The Court is still controversial since powerful states such as the United 
States, Russia, China, and India are unwilling to join.303 While some 
have argued that the ICC has failed to live up to the high expectations of 
the international community, one area that the ICC has shown a great 
deal of leadership in is the field of victim’s rights; the ICC has a number 
of victim-centered laws designed to empower and include the victims of 
the crimes.304 The ICC’s “innovative, victim-centered approach include: 
informing victims of decisions that concern them; allowing victims’ 
participation in proceedings; providing legal aid for the victim’s repre-
sentation; taking measures for victims’ protection, offering support, as-
sistance, and being able to claim reparation.”305 
The ICC’s subject matter, personal, and territorial jurisdictions are 
limited. The Court is limited to hearing cases involving four crimes: 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and the crime of ag-
gression.306 It can hear a case if the crime is committed on the territory 
of a State Party to the Rome Statute, if the accused is a national of a 
State Party, or if a non-State Party has accepted the jurisdiction of the 
ICC with respect to the crime at issue.307 However, if the U.N. Security 
Council refers the case to the ICC, these limitations do not apply, and 
the ICC can hear cases about crimes originating in or committed by na-
tionals of states that are not parties to the Rome Statute.308 The U.N. Se-
curity Council, under its Chapter VII powers—which apply only when 
there are threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or an act of aggres-
 
 301.  CRYER, supra note 79, at 144. 
 302.  Susana SaCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the International Crimi-
nal Court, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 807, 808 (2007). 
 303.  Sarkin, supra note 68, at 83. 
 304.  T. MARKUS FUNK, VICTIM’S RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, 43 (2010). 
 305.  WADDELL & CLARK, supra note 171, at 66. 
 306.  Rome Statute, supra note 296, art. 1.  
 307.  Rome Statute, art. 12(2); see also id.  art. 124 (stating “notwithstanding Article 12, par-
agraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of 
seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in Article 8 when a 
crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declaration under 
this Article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions of this Article shall be reviewed at the 
Review Conference convened in accordance with Article 123, paragraph 1.”). 
 308.  Id. art. 13(b). 
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sion—can also ask the ICC to defer an investigation or prosecution for 
renewable periods of up to twelve months.309 
The ICC is currently investigating eight situations: Uganda, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Sudan, Central African Re-
public, Kenya, Libya, and Côte d’Voire.310 Four out of the eight ongoing 
ICC cases against African individuals were referred to The Hague by 
their own governments.311 The cases of Kenya and Côte d’Voire were a 
result of the ICC prosecutor’s decision to launch his own investiga-
tion.312 Libya and Sudan, both not parties to the Rome Statute, were re-
ferred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council.313 While all the current 
situations are in Africa, the Office of the Prosecutor is also conducting 
preliminary examinations in a number of situations including Afghani-
stan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Honduras, Korea, and Nigeria; the 
ICC currently holds “all of its trials in The Hague.”314 
While there has been some discussion about “moving small parts 
of the trials to the countries where the alleged crimes took place,” very 
little effort seems focused on making local or regional trials a main 
component of the ICC’s framework.315 Furthermore, despite the interna-
tional community’s recognition of the benefits in on-location trials, due 
to security concerns and the lack of effective safeguards in some cases, 
the general advantages of holding a proceeding in the country where the 
crimes took place—or even a neighboring country—may pose more 
risks than benefits. One recent example is the ICC’s involvement in 
Kenya. Initially, President Uhuru Kenyatta, Deputy President William 
Ruto, and broadcaster Joshua Arap Sang’s trials were scheduled to start 
in early April, 2013.316 They were all charged with “crimes against hu-
manity arising out of the post-election violence” that took place in Ken-
ya between 2007 and 2008.317 In February 2013, Kenyan witnesses “re-
 
 309.  Id. art. 16; Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression, United Nations 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. 
 310.  Situations and Cases, supra note 26. 
 311.  Id. 
 312.  Sarkin, supra note 68, at 84. 
 313.  Id.  
 314.  Stuart Ford, International Criminal Court and Proximity to the Scene of the Crime: 
Does the Rome Statue Permit All of the ICC’s Trials to Take Place at Local or Regional Cham-
bers, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 715, 716 (2009-2010). 
 315.  Id.  
 316.  Kenya: Witnesses Reject ICC Move to Arusha, STAR (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201302051231.html?viewall=1.  
 317.  Id.  
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jected a proposal to move the Kenyan ICC trials” to the neighboring 
country of Tanzania because they still feared for their safety there.318 
The year before, Kenyan witnesses “rejected a plan to relocate them to 
African countries after the trials are over” because “they need[ed] to 
stay in Europe to ensure their safety.”319 These cases highlight the need 
to take additional efforts to address the underlying causes of such fears 
and to ensure that appropriate and effective safeguards are in place to 
protect those who participate in ICC proceedings and investigations. 
The ICC completed its first case on March 14, 2012 when it found 
Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo “guilty of having committed 
the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 
15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the 
[Democratic Republic of Congo] between September 2002 and August 
2003.”320 This trial was the “first test of formal victim participation in an 
international criminal trial,” with a total of 129 victims participating 
through their legal representatives.321 
B.  Completion Strategies for the International Criminal Court 
The Rome Statute provides very little guidance on how the Court 
should close its investigations.322 The ICC will, in time, complete its 
work in each of the current situation countries.323 While the permanency 
of the ICC does address some of the completion and residual issues that 
ad hoc tribunals necessarily face due to their temporary nature, Valerie 
Oosterveld, Director of Western University’s Centre for Transitional 
Justice and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, notes that the ICC will need to 
consider how to handle situations when it decides to “scale down its in-
 
 318.  Id. 
 319.  Id.  
 320.  Lubanga Case, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. COURT, 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=drctimelinelubanga.  
 321.  Id.  
 322.  Rome Conference, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. COURT, 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=rome (last visited March 22, 2014); see Rebecca J. Hamilton, Clos-
ing ICC Investigations: A Second Bite at the Cherry for Complementarity?, HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROGRAM 1, 9‒10 (May 2012), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Hamilton.pdf. (Some have maintained that 
Article 53(3) b of the Rome Statute, which allows the pre-trial chamber to review a prosecutors’ 
decision to open an investigation also allows for a review of the prosecutor’s decision to close an 
investigation. Others argue that Article 53(3) b, as it pertains to the closure of investigations, is 
ambiguous). 
 323.  The International Criminal Court and the Closure of the Time-Limited International 
and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 241, at 14.  
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vestigatory and outreach presence in a situation country in response to a 
lack of international action on arrest warrants.”324 Oosterveld suggests 
that “[i]f the ICC does scale down its [operation] in a situation country, 
it must also plan for future rapid scaling up of investigatory, defense 
and outreach presence if fugitives are captured and transferred to the 
ICC.”325 
Completion strategies need to be part of the ICC’s initial consider-
ations when the ICC begins its involvement in a situation country. Real-
istically, however, there are limitations to the amount of detail that can 
be included in such strategies; for instance, it is often difficult to predict 
the number of trial and appeals there will be during the early stages of 
involvement.326 That said, planning the process by which the Court will 
close its investigations and end its proceedings as well as planning how 
the information is gathered and interpreted into an eventual strategy 
document is important to develop at the earliest stage possible.327 Such a 
strategy should address the ICC’s responsibilities after the proceedings 
are completed, or in other words, its residual activities.328 This infor-
mation should also be disseminated to the affected communities as well 
as the international community early on to establish appropriate expec-
tations and understanding of the entire process. Some have suggested 
that the first draft of the completion strategy document should “be circu-
lated to all interested parties for information and comment” and updated 
biannually.329 
Additionally, to keep “external interested parties” updated on 
“progress and long term thinking,” the ICC should consider suggestions 
made about conducting presentations and explanations when meeting 
with international and national NGOs as well as with other stakeholders, 
such as local civil society organizations.330 Using outreach programs to 
explain early on that the Court is undertaking responsibility for activi-
ties after the end of judicial proceedings will help preserve a positive 
legacy for the ICC and increase awareness among the communities 
about what resources would be available to them, such as witness pro-
tection programs and access to archived information. By ensuring af-
fected communities are able to understand and stay apprised of the 
 
 324.  Oosterveld, supra note 241, at 29. 
 325.  Id.  
 326.  Vincent, supra note 4, at 146. 
 327.  Id. 
 328.  Id. at 147.  
 329.  Id. at 148. 
 330.  Id. at 149. 
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ICC’s advancement, the ICC can empower local communities, bring 
perpetrators of human rights to justice, and strengthen a nation’s justice 
system, thereby serving its goal to end impunity and prevent future 
atrocities. 
C.  Residual Mechanisms for the International Criminal Court 
Although the ad hoc tribunals residual mechanisms are still in their 
infancy, the awareness and planning that went into their formation cre-
ates valuable knowledge and experience which the ICC can build on 
and tailor to match its own specific residual issues. As previously stated, 
the ICC’s permanency does address some of the residual issues that ad 
hoc institutions faced; for example, the ICC would not need to formu-
late a mechanism to prosecute fugitives post-closure.331 Additionally, it 
would not need to concern itself with the issue of transferring cases to 
an impartial forum that can guarantee a fair trial.332 Despite that, other 
residual issues still remain. After the ICC proceedings end, the ICC 
would still have ongoing responsibilities to protect victims and witness-
es, ensure that sentences remain enforced, and that affected populations 
have access to archives. 
In response to these issues, the ICC’s Assembly of State Parties 
Committee on Budget and Finance has stated that “appropriate consid-
eration should be given to the role that the field offices are expected to 
play and how, at the conclusion of Court proceedings in a given area, 
any residual issues should be handled.”333 
The choice to keep the principal seats of the residual ICTY, ICTR, 
and the SCSL in The Hague, Arusha, and Freetown, respectively, 
helped ensure continuity with the support of existing host city rela-
tions.334 For future residual mechanisms, however, the residual activities 
should always, whenever possible, take place in the situation country as 
it allows the mechanism to become embedded in the communities’ so-
cial fabrics.335 Furthermore, this helps the communities learn to accept 
 
 331.  Oosterveld, supra note 241, at 29; see Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 41, at 53 
(highlighting the issue ad hoc institutions face when deciding how to try fugitives post-closure).  
 332.  Id. 
 333.  International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Committee on 
Budget and Finance on the Work of Its Twelfth Session, ¶ 73, ICC-ASP/8/5 (May 13, 2009), 
available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/ICC-ASP-8-5-ENG.pdf [hereinafter 
2009 Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance]. 
 334.  See Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 63 (discussing the advantages of not re-
locating the ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL). 
 335.  ICTJ’s SCSL Legacy Podcast Series: Alison Smith, supra note 216. 
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the judgments and arrests made by the Court.336 Therefore, the Court 
should follow civil society’s suggestions and seek to increase its field 
presence and utilize field offices to carry out residual work after the ju-
dicial proceedings are completed. 
By developing its own archival system, the ICC can also learn 
from the experiences of ad hoc tribunals.337 For example, the ICTY and 
ICTR failed to “adopt common public [versus] confidential security 
classification systems from the beginning of their existence,” thus an 
additional, and even avoidable, burden was created on the process of 
preparing the archives for closure.338 The delayed availability of infor-
mation to the public could foreseeably cause distrust, frustration, and 
disengagement impacting the Court’s legacy. 
The ICC can learn from these experiences and employ mecha-
nisms and procedures from the beginning of a case to keep track of doc-
ument sources and to “ensure consistency in the way information is 
classified and processed within the different organs.”339 Thus, the ICC 
would prevent having additional work for itself, but also use this ar-
chive as an opportunity to establish best practices. Additionally, “[c]lear 
policies should be developed from the outset” of the court’s activities in 
order to “facilitat[e] the legacy of court archives” and establish “which 
documents will be retained and where they . . . [will] be kept.340 Access 
to archives is important to prevent “historical revisionism and to facili-
tate historical research.”341 Therefore, should the ICC choose to keep its 
case archives in The Hague, it is essential that affected populations also 
have access to these documents. The ICC should make sure to consider 
this issue during the beginning of its involvement. 
In regards to the issue of victim and witness protection, the dis-
tance of the ICC from the current situation in the countries pose an ob-
vious obstacle since the location of victim and witness protection mech-
anisms are important. These mechanisms have proven to work best 
when it is physically situated where the crimes took place.342 Currently, 
all eight of the ICC’s cases involve states in Africa.343 If the ICC choos-
 
 336.  Id.  
 337.  Oosterveld, supra note 241, at 30. 
 338.  Id. 
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 343.  Michael Birnbaum, African LeadersComplain of Bias at the ICC as Kenya Trials get 
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es to not establish field offices in each of these situation countries to 
help facilitate victim and witness protection, it should at the very least 
ensure that some form of regional coordination with field offices is in 
the nearby countries. 
In order to preserve the Court’s legacy, outreach regarding residual 
mechanisms is essential. Outreach efforts to explain witness programs 
in order to overcome witnesses’ fears, is crucial to its efficacy. Without 
knowledge of the availability of the witness protection programs and 
their capabilities, it is unlikely that even the most capable witness pro-
tection programs can be successful.344 Effective outreach efforts will not 
only increase witness involvement in trials, but can also foster the pos-
sibility of allowing local trials if witnesses understand that their identi-
ties will be protected and that they have relocation as a possibility. As 
highlighted in the instance of the SCSL, holding trials where the crimes 
occurred, or at least, closer to where the crimes occurred, has numerous 
benefits. For example, according to a recent legacy survey, the impact 
of the SCSL’s work was much greater in Sierra Leone, where the court 
was located, than in neighboring Liberia, which was also greatly im-
pacted by the conflict.345 
D.  The International Criminal Court’s Legacy 
The ICC is still struggling to establish relevance in affected com-
munities.346 While the ICC has acknowledged the need to tackle legacy 
issues and to engage in “discussions about completion strategies, resid-
ual functions and legacy in the other tribunals and courts . . . to build[] 
on their experience and knowledge,”347 it seems that the ICC is never-
theless repeating its predecessors’ mistakes by not planning for its lega-
cy early on in its activities.348 
Because “[h]olding trials within the concerned state allows the 
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public to participate far more closely in the proceedings, and the pro-
ceedings themselves can have important effects on issues such as truth 
and reconciliation,”349 the ICC must begin to prioritize the implementa-
tion of locally based activities to ensure its efficacy, efficiency, and leg-
acy so that the disconnect caused by distance can be resolved.350 If the 
ICC fails to consider such issues, it will not only undermine the Court’s 
work and legacy, but can also have greater repercussions on the legiti-
macy and integrity in the ever-evolving system of international criminal 
justice.351 If the Court does not play an educative and preventive func-
tion by establishing a process “to promote reconciliation and ensure 
nonrepetition of human rights violations in the future, then the same 
events that led to the violations are likely to reoccur.”352 The Court 
needs to “begin elaborating its vision for what it intends to accomplish 
in any given country, what legacy it will leave, how it will assure that 
legacy and what resources it will need to do so.”353 
The prosecutions made by international courts are often at risk of 
not properly resonating with the affect communities and victims.354 
Since the ICC is a headquarter-based institution located in the Hague, 
civil society groups, such as the NGO No Peace Without Justice, have 
“consistently advocated for the ICC to become closer to the victims, 
communities and other stakeholders affected by its work in situation 
countries.”355 The ICC currently has a minimal presence in these situa-
tion countries, which make it difficult for the Court to carry out its day-
to-day operations, create and maintain meaningful interactions with the 
affected communities, and contribute anything of significance to the 
impact of the Court in these countries.356 In order to increase ownership 
in its proceedings, the ICC should engage with a variety of different ac-
tors, such as civil society groups, local bar associations, victim groups, 
the diplomatic community, and the international aid organizations, 
throughout the court’s involvement in the concerned country.357 
In addition to increasing ownership, the ICC, through the “demon-
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stration effect” of the norms and values of due process and international 
human rights, “may be able to have an impact on domestic systems and 
contribute to a culture of human rights.”358 Education and dissemination 
of information is critical because a lack of regional knowledge about 
trials diminishes the importance of precedent in the region.359 According 
to ICTY’s former Chief Prosecutor, Justice Richard Goldstone, “the ju-
dicial process is insufficient alone to satisfy the human need for know-
ing the truth of a tragic series of events. In addition to criminal prosecu-
tion, it is necessary for a damaged society to arrive at a wider 
understanding of the causes of its suffering.”360 Therefore, public educa-
tion during and after the ICC proceedings should be essential compo-
nents in legacy planning. To assist with educating affected communi-
ties, the ICC should try and replicate the ICTY’s project of making its 
case documents accessible by also publishing and distributing its judg-
ments in local languages.361 
Outreach programs are not only necessary for the ICC to be effec-
tive and efficient, but also play an important role in preserving the 
Court’s legacy. “Sustained dialogue with victims and affected popula-
tions can help reduce frustration and disappointment,” in addition to 
helping those communities take ownership of trials.362 Despite the im-
portance of these activities, the ICC’s in-country activities have been 
“poorly equipped to respond to unfolding political developments,” 
which has led to common remark by those in the situation countries that 
“the Court is not present.”363 In addition, the Court’s ability to monitor 
and analyze outreach is limited by the fact that the function is coordi-
nated and based from the Hague; it has been argued that the ICC should 
try to involve “core partners at the country level” to increase the effec-
tiveness of its outreach efforts.364 
The ICC should look to the experience of the SCSL, particularly 
the Charles Taylor trial (which took place in the Hague), and seek to 
utilize some of the SCSL court’s outreach strategies. The SCSL en-
gaged the Prosecution team in its outreach efforts by having Chief Pros-
ecutor David Crane travel across the country to the affected communi-
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ties.365 It was important for David Crane to personally speak with those 
in the affected communities about the events that had occurred and have 
them meet the prosecutor working on their behalf.366 The SCSL also 
used more community volunteers than outreach officers, which had sev-
eral advantages. First, most of the volunteers were unpaid, which in-
creased outreach without increasing the SCSL’s limited budget. Second, 
these individuals were far more familiar with the customs and culture of 
the communities with whom they were engaging. Third, particularly in 
areas with different tribal dialects, these volunteers were able to com-
municate directly with the populations rather than speak through a 
translator. If the ICC trains local volunteers from the affected communi-
ties, it can create an effective local presence for the court as well as a 
participatory mechanism for the local community.367 The ICC should al-
so consider using the media to educate the public, such as broadcasting 
its trials and sharing knowledge of how they work while taking into ac-
count what limited infrastructure may be available to disseminate such 
information. 
The ICC faces risks of its work being undermined each time it fails 
to reach out and explain why the Court made certain choices. An exam-
ple of such failure derives from the ICC’s first trial; despite the many 
allegations of murder and sexual violence, Thomas Lubanga was ulti-
mately charged with only three war crimes: conscripting children under 
the age of fifteen years old into armed groups; enlisting children into 
armed groups, and using children to participate actively in armed con-
flict.368 During the beginning stages of investigation, Congolese authori-
ties unexpectedly detained Lubanga; it was also unclear as to how long 
they would be able to hold him in custody.369 At that time, the ICC pros-
ecutor had only gathered sufficient evidence in regards to the child re-
cruitment charges, but not the sexual offenses or murder charges.370 The 
ICC had chose to employ a prosecutorial strategy by choosing to charge 
the accused based on the strength of the evidence against the accused 
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and how much could be proved.371 It should be noted here that such 
prosecutorial discretion is not without checks and balances by the pre-
trial chambers.372 Despite the Court’s system of checks and balances, the 
general population unaware of the strategy was left frustrated without 
explanation for why certain charges were not pursued by the prosecu-
tion.373 This left a sense of injustice to the affected communities; by not 
disclosing the underlying goodwill, an obstacle to reconciliation was 
created, one that may lead to the cycle of violence being left unbro-
ken.374 
Accordingly, the ICC’s judicial functions, non-judicial functions, 
and its long-term legacy would be improved by maintaining a stronger 
and permanent representation in situation countries.375 As of 2010, 
85.6% of ICC personnel are allocated to headquarters and 14.4% to sit-
uation countries.376 While the ICC is operating under tight budgetary re-
strictions, the Court is at risk of paralysis if it is unable to execute its es-
sential functions, some of which necessarily require a field presence. 
For example, the predicament created by the ICC’s distance from the 
current situation countries has led to some hostility and a loss of com-
munity support in Africa.377 
While the ICC can learn from the lessons of the ad hoc criminal 
tribunals, it will have to create its own approach to legacy. Because of 
the global reach of the ICC, it cannot just create a singular legacy strat-
egy for the entire court. It will have to work with the individual situa-
tion countries early on to create a legacy strategy by consulting key 
stakeholders and victims and representatives from affected communi-
ties.378 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The creation of international criminal tribunals has greatly ad-
vanced the international community’s mission to end impunity and es-
tablish foundations for lasting peace. While that may be true, if the in-
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ternational community does not begin prioritizing completion strategies, 
residual mechanisms, and legacy planning, these advancements are at 
risk of being undone. While the need to leave a legacy is now firmly ac-
cepted as part of the Unite Nations policy, how these activities are to be 
incorporated remains uncertain and inconsistent.379 
The ICC must consider not only how it enters a community torn 
apart by atrocities, but also be mindful of how it intends to leave it. The 
ICC will have to address many of the same residual issues and legacy 
questions that the ad hoc criminal tribunals have previously faced and 
are still handling. Similar to the obstacles that ICTR and ICTY faced as 
a result of their distance from the affected populations, the ICC will 
have to make additional efforts so that the affected communities have 
the opportunity to take ownership over the trials with the goal of estab-
lishing a basis for peace and reconciliation. Just as the completion of the 
ad hoc criminal tribunals, the ICC’s completion of judicial proceeding 
will not only impact the “sustainability of peace and the rule of law 
within the countries concerned, but also the extent of public support and 
legitimacy for international justice in general.”380 
Accordingly, policy priorities need to be formulated early on, em-
phasizing the creation of a strong legacy programs so that the focus is 
not solely on its trials or convictions. The ICC should begin drafting a 
legacy strategy plan before its proceedings commence, outlining com-
munity needs and goals as well as identifying potential problems in ad-
vance to tackle. Legacy programs need to focus on increasing its en-
gagement with domestic institutions, the training of the country’s 
domestic justice sector personnel, particularly prosecutors, attorneys, 
judges, and magistrates, as well as working on establishing a relation-
ship with the situation country (and its surrounding states).381 While 
scarceness of resources may lead the ICC to try to minimize these ef-
forts and initiate the implementation of its residual functions only after 
the completion of proceedings, short-changing legacy efforts puts what-
ever success the Court may have had at grave risk of being undermined 
or undone. Therefore, in order for the ICC to reach its full potential, it 
must create a completion strategy that plans the necessary residual 
mechanisms, which will ultimately impact the Court’s legacy. To estab-
lish a positive legacy, it is not enough to bring certain perpetrators to 
justice; it is also necessary that the affected communities impacted by 
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the ICC’s work, and the international community as a whole, see and 
understand that justice is being done. 
VI. POSTSCRIPT 
At the time of writing, the ICC faced arguably the most important 
public perception battle in its history. In 2013, the ICC’s announced that 
it lacked sufficient evidence to proceed in its high profile case against 
Kenya’s current President, Uhuru Kenyatta.382 ICC Prosecutor Fatou 
Bensouda explained that she could no longer rely on the two key wit-
nesses she needed to try the Kenyan President because one witness was 
no longer willing to testify and the other witness confessed to having 
provided false evidence.383 After the announcement, a poll showed that 
the percentage of Kenyans who supported the ICC process fell from 
55% in April 2012 to 39%.384 At Assembly of State Parties in November 
2013, Kenyan leaders had also won concessions that essentially made it 
easier for them to forgo some court sessions and attend others remotely 
by video link rather than being required to come in person at The 
Hague.385 Some Human Rights Advocates have argued that the weight 
these cases have placed on the ICC has resulted in changes that will un-
dermine the entire court.386 
The ICC’s involvement in Kenya began in March 2010, when the 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the “prosecution authorisation to 
open an investigation proprio motu in the situation of Kenya.”387 In 
2011, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William 
Ruto were indicted on charges of encouraging violence after the disput-
ed elections in December 2007, which resulted in the deaths of approx-
imately 1,100 people.388 The President and Deputy President unsuccess-
fully sought permission from both the ICC and U.N. Security Council to 
“skip ICC proceedings in the name of national security and pushed for 
immunity from prosecution for sitting heads of state.”389 In fact, on the 
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day of the Nairobi Westgate mall attack, Deputy President Ruto was 
permitted to leave The Hague and return to Kenya to coordinate a re-
sponse; Kenyan officials have argued that the ICC prosecutions were 
distracting their leaders from counter-terrorism efforts.390 Eventually, as 
stated above, the Kenyan leaders succeeded; Deputy President Ruto will 
be permitted to forgo attendance for part of his trial. 
After the Westgate attack, Kenya helped convene an October 
summit of the African Union, where the ICC’s focus on Africa was 
condemned.391 At that summit, Hailemariam Dessalegn, the Prime Min-
ister of Ethiopia and current African Union chairman, “read out the un-
ion’s collective complaint against the ICC’s “unfair treatment” of Afri-
cans, criticizing the ICC “as a condescending political instrument 
targeting Africa and Africans;” Kenya’s President, Uhuru Kenyatta, 
called the ICC a racist “toy of declining imperial powers.”392 Observers 
noted that, “African leaders have viewed the [Kenyan] case with in-
creasing bitterness and criticism, contending that the court is preoccu-
pied with pursuing cases in Africa exclusively.”393 The summit ended 
with a joint recommendation that President Kenyatta be able to skip his 
trial at the ICC, scheduled to begin in November 2014.394 Despite the 
public uproar, the AU states—which comprise of thirty-four out of 122 
State Parties to the Rome Statue—did not reach an agreement regarding 
whether to withdraw from the ICC.395 
This development is just the latest of many struggles with Kenya 
that are now bringing into question not only the future of those cases, 
but also of the AU’s general support of the ICC. The controversy has 
added momentum to other ICC battles, such as the ICC’s case against 
Omer Hassan al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, Abdel-Rahim Mo-
hamed Hussein, Defense Minister of Sudan, Ahmed Haroun, the gover-
nor of North Kordofan, and militia leader Ali Kushayb.396 Al-Bashir, 
who became the first head of state targeted by the ICC in 2008, was 
charged with committing genocide in the Darfur region. He has accused 
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the court of having a bias against Africans and rejected the jurisdiction 
of the ICC by asserting that it is not a party to the Rome Statute. 397 
Only time will tell the outcome of these cases and the impact that 
these events will have on the ICC’s legacy. If nothing is done to ensure 
that affected communities have ownership over these cases, the ICC’s 
legacy will inevitably be in peril. 
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